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INTRODUCTION 
Reserves are an accepted fact in the history of 
native people in Canada. For most of Canada's Indians they 
are a stark, harsh reality which draws boundaries of poverty 
around them, separating them, perhaps inextricably, from 
the main stream of economic progress in Canada. 
For decades a debate has raged among government 
officials, Indian leaders and white philanthropists concern-
ing the exact role the reserve has played in shaping the 
existence of Canada's native population. By some they are 
reviled as the main feature of an apartheid system which 
has led to cultural rigidity and economic exclusion. Others 
have viewed them as necessary evils, as a cultural enclave 
which allowed the Indian to maintain elements at least of 
a culture being buffeted on all sides. The truth is pro-
bably somewhere in between, Initially designed to assist 
the Indian while they developed the skills needed to fit 
into the emerging Canadian society, they have, in the process, 
become stagnant pools of poverty, despair and powerlessness. 
It seems ironic that despite this continuing debate, 
and despite various attempts to analyze the official policy 
change on the part of the British Government towards reserves 
in the iniddle of the eighteenth century, nobody has delved 
deeply into the events surrounding and the history of the 
first major attempt by the Imperial British Government to 
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create a reserve to 'civilize' and 'cultivate habits of 
industriousness' among the native people of Canada, 
The establishment of Coldwater-Narrows Indian 
Reserve in 1830 was in many ways the culmination of one 
period of Government-Indian relations and the beginning of 
another. As the first government sponsored agricultural 
reserve in British North America the events which surround 
Coldwater-Narrows, its perceived success or failure, con-
tain significance which belies its relatively brief exist-
ence. The lessons learned here went ·deep into the 
consciousness of Indian Department officials. 
Coldwater-Narrows also marks, perhaps, the most 
obvious, although not the most successful, attempt on the 
part of significant elements of the Ojibwa in Upper Canada 
to create for themselves and the generations to follow a 
viable place in the society which was taking shape around 
them, 
In the two centuries before the reserve period the 
Ojibwa had emerged from a small population of isolated clan 
villages, centred at the head of Lake Huron with little 
sense of cultural affiliation. As the fur trade began to 
envelop them not only did their material culture thrive but 
their sense of nationhood, of cultural affiliation and ties 
with those bands around them developed into the full 
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realization of an Ojibwa people. Their numbers increased 
dramatically, they annexed huge areas, and as the fur trade 
more obviously favored their aboriginal way of life over 
those of previously more prosperous tribes, the Ojibwa 
became in many ways the model for a Pan-Indian culture. 
This flowering of the Ojibwa culture only served to 
enhance an already strong sense of individual autonomy in 
which any constraints on the individual were regarded as 
undue fetters. But it seemed, just as the Ojibwa gradually 
became inextricably dependent on European goods for their 
survival, the fur trade had bypassed them, their hunting 
grounds became depleted and their lands encroached upon by 
white settlers. The Ojibwa were forced to accept government 
payment to survive, were forced to accept government direc-
tion in their warfare and diplomacy and, slowly but surely, 
were forced to accept white law and dictates in their 
personal relations. Many Ojibwa had become aware that old 
beliefs and traditional ways no longer worked in the radical-
ly altered circumstances which engulfed them. The fact that 
Coldwater-Narrows ultimately proved of little assistance in 
preparing the Ojibwa to function viably in these altered 
circumstances held significant portent for later Ojibwa 
history in Upper Canada. 
Coldwater-Narrows is also a good example of that 
process common in the history of European expansion but 
) 
perhaps best described by George Copway, an Ojibwa: 
"Behold the change! Commerce urged 
on by the pale face strides rapidly and 
resistlessly into the midst and orders them 
back, back, back, to make way for its houses 
and its merchandize. Scarce is he camped 
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ere he once again is told to go further west."(1) 
Upper Canada in the 1800's was the scene of a 
pitched battle between those whose actions Emeric de Vattel 
attempted to justify in publicizing a Swiss jurist's opin-
ion that "every nation is therefore bound by natural law 
to cultivate the land which has fallen to its share, .. ( 2 ) 
and those who had been most successful in assisting the 
Ojibwa to do just that. The Methodist missionaries had 
demonstrated noted success in shepherding their Ojibwa 
charges to an orderly life based on industrious agricultur-
al production. Coldwater-Narrows occurred at the zenith of 
Methodist influence in Upper Canada. The success of 
Coldwater-Narrows and, perhaps more importantly, the amount 
of control they were able to maintain over both the estab-
lishment and the Ojibwa involved in it were perceived to be 
of primary importance to the continued growth of Methodist 
missions in Upper Canada. Hardening governmental determin-
ation to stifle that growth became most apparent at Cold-
water-Narrows, while (occasionally) both the Methodists 
and the Indian Department felt compelled to work together 
to insulate the Ojibwa against those settlers clamouring for 
the land the Indian controlled. The growing belief on_the 
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part of the Methodists, the Indian Department and the 
Indians themselves that they would be unable to do so acted 
in conjunction with the unique circumstances eventually to 
insure that the fear would come to fruition. The forced 
Ojibwa abandonment of the Coldwater-Narrows enclave was 
both a dramatic instance of the process Copway describes 
and a warning to other Ojibwa in Upper Canada. 
For all these reasons a thorough examination of 
the Coldwater-Narrows experiment would seem to do much to 
illuminate an important period in Canadian Indian history. 
A few have skirted the topic. R. Surtees, in an unpub-
lished master's thesis entitled "The Development of the 
Indian Reserve Policy in Upper Canada",(3) draws a picture 
of the shifting and buckling which went on within the Indian 
Department during this period to accommodate the govern-
ment's jump into the fray. Peter Schmaltz has given us a 
detailed account of the Saugeen Indians, concentrating much 
of his attention on this period in an unpublished M.A. thesis( 4 ) 
and a later revision, The History of the Saugeen Indians.(5) 
Donald Smith's unpublished Ph.D. thesis "The Mississ-
auga, Peter Jones, and the White Man: The Algonkians 
Adjustment to the Europeans on the North Shore of Lake 
Ontario to 1860"( 6 ) covers much of the background leading 
up to the Coldwater-Narrows experiment and gives a good 
over-view of related events in Upper C:anada but concentrates 
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primarily on the Credit Mission and Peter Jones' exertions. 
Similarly, E. Graham's Ph.D. thesis, "Strategies and Souls"(?) 
and later book Medicine Man to Missionary,(S) while cover-
ing roughly the same period in Upper Canada, concentrate 
primarily on Government/Missionary jockeying for position 
and only mention the Coldwater-Narrows experiment. None of 
these works provide us with the detailed discussion of the 
government's first major step that any understanding and 
illustration of subsequent reserve history seems to demand. 
In attempting to provide this detailed description 
and to explain the events which occurred during the experi-
ment it is first necessary to come to some understanding of 
the position the Ojibwa found themselves in in Upper Canada 
during the early 1800's. Numerous secondary sources have 
described early Ojibwa history in the Great Lakes area, 
their growing tribal awareness, material and cultural 
fluorescence and a number of the studies previously men-
tioned discuss in some detail the pervading changes which 
overwhelmed the Ojibwa in Upper Canada during the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless a synthesis of these 
various works seems in order. For, just as subsequent 
reserve history in the Dominion cannot be fully understood 
without first viewing the Coldw::;.ter-Narrows experiment, 
that establishment and its significance cannot be compre-
hended if they are not placed, graphically, within the con-
text of the accelerating development of the colony itself 
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and the swift, all-encompassing changes which engulfed the 
Ojibwa in the two centuries before Coldwater-Narrows. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE OJIBWA BEFORE THE FUR TRADE 
A number of nineteenth century historians have 
given us a variety of colourful explanations concerning how 
the people who called themselves Anishnaube (spontaneous 
man) became known to the French and ultimately posterity 
as the 'Ojibwa', Ojibwa meant 'to pucker' and this has 
been alternatively explained as an appellation given them 
because of the way their moccasins puckered from the 
stitching,(l) or even more colourfully as how their enemies 
looked after being roasted.( 2 ) The most logical explanation 
though is that one given by Edward Neill suggesting that it 
was derived from the pucker of water caused by the narrows 
at Sault Ste Marie.(3) If Sault Ste Marie indeed has the 
honor of contributing the name to the Ojibwa it is an 
honor well deserved, for the narrows at Sault Ste Marie and 
the attendant white fish fishery played a pivotal role in 
the development of a sense of nationhood and shared cultural 
traits among the Ojibwa. 
In 1641, the time of the first recorded contact 
between the French and the diverse Algonkian bands located 
throughout the Upper Great Lakes area, these bands were just 
emerging from a long period of gradual cultural development. 
This cultural progression, the late Woodland Period, was 
8 
9 
characterized by the autonomous development of small 
isolated groups demonstrating "extreme cultural diversity".< 4 ) 
The semi-nomadic utilization of the resources available had 
encouraged the limiting of social grouping to small summer 
villages of one hundred to one hundred and fifty people.(5) 
These villages were in essence little more than "territori-
ally-based descent groups",( 6) a brief gathering of a few 
small hunting units who felt they shared a common ancestor 
or totem, were able to draw their organization from the 
sense of kinship that evolved and felt a commonality because 
of a "consciousness of neighbourhood."(?) During the bulk 
of the year even these small villages dissolved. They, by 
necessity, split into a myriad of isolated family hunting 
units. These villages were all related culturally, spoke 
a mutually intelligible language, engaged in similar econo-
mic pursuits and shared certain concepts of religion and 
individual autonomy.(S) 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century the 
concept of a cultural tie which joined all these bands into 
one powerful, if loose, tribal entity was already well 
established. In searching for the spark that helped set off 
this rapid development, historians have traditionally been 
quick to point to the fur trade as the most important single 
element. There is no denying the pervasive effect of the 
fur trade but the process had begun before the fur trade 
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had been felt directly by the northern Algonkians. The 
key to this nascent development was the white fish fishery 
at the narrows of Sault Ste Marie. 
The impulse for the isolated village group had 
always lain in economic necessity. To survive in the 
relatively sparse flora and fauna of the Northern Great 
Lakes region these Algonkian speaking people had developed 
a complex round of activity based on six distinct seasons. 
Each of these six seasons (bibon, sigun, misohamik, nibon, 
tagwagia, nimegsikang)(9) was characterized by a distinct 
economic activity. From December to March, bibon, was 
spent in family hunt camps pursuing moose and deer. March 
to mid-April, sigun, was maple sugar time. Three or four 
related families would congregate at large maple groves 
where the women would collect the syrup and the men would 
spear fish. By mid-April a few of the men would travel south 
to trade meat, furs and sugar to the Huron for corn and 
tobacco while the others would hunt and fish.(lO) This 
round of varied activity would continue throughout the 
year. 
The Saulteur had not been forced into this annual 
seasonal activity. The abundant white fish harvest during 
the summer had allowed 
to live in a permanent 
about one hundred and fifty of them 
1 11) settlement at Sault Ste Marie 1 
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relying on the harvest and local hunting to supply their 
needs. During periods of' hardship, particularly in the 
early winter before enough snow had fallen to allow the 
families to scatter to hunt camps in search of' moose and 
deer, various neighbouring kin groups were periodically 
forced by hunger to travel to the Sault to barter or beg 
from the Saulteur's supplies. Gradually more and more of' 
these kin groups would return to the Sault Narrows to fish 
during the summer months. As the number of' people attend-
ing the fishery grew it became a most convenient spot from 
which to organize and launch joint trading ventures to the 
Huron, or for the Huron to approach to accomplish their 
trading. As the importance of' the fishery at the Narrows 
became increasingly apparent more and more diverse people 
began to meet there during the summer and,increasingly, to 
stay over the winter months. The paramount position of' the 
Saulteur became even more evident. 
During the mid-1600's the Jes~it, Claude Dabion, 
described the Saulteur as having allied themselves with 
three other bands of' five hundred and fifty people who by 
then were living at Sault Ste Marie permanently. He 
estimated that there were approximately four hundred and 
fifty others who hunted in the area and fished there in 
summer, as well as another five hundred who were "entirely 
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nomadic" but returned to fish in summer.(lZ) 
Throughout this period the Sault garnered increas-
ing importance as a centre for religious and ceremonial 
activity. The growing congregation of people allowed for 
a flowering of that ceremonial life usually engaged in 
during summer months in the village. Its role as a primary 
trading centre also fostered the growth of shared ceremonies 
with other groups, such as the Hurons, which strengthened 
alliances. 
This was obviously one of the major functions of 
the Feast of the Dead held at the Sault which the Jesuit, 
Jerome Lalement, described: 
"Those of each Nation, before landing, 
in order to make their entry more imposing, 
form their canoes in line to wait until others 
come to meet them. When the people are 
assembled the chief stands up in the middle 
of his canoe and states the object that has 
brought them thither. Thereupon each one 
throws away a portion of his goods to be 
scrambled for. Some articles float on the 
water, while others sink to the bottom. The 
young men hasten to the spot. One will seize 
a net, wrought as tapestries are in France; 
another a beaver skin; others get a hatchet 
or dish .... There is nothing but joy, cries 
and public acclamations to which the rocks 
surrounding the great lake return an echo 
that drowns all their voices. 
When all the Nations are assembled and 
divided, each in their own seats, beaver 
robes, skins of otter, of caribou, of wild 
cats and of moose;_ hatchets, kettles, pome-
kein beads and all things that are precious 
in this country are exhibited. Each chief 
of a Nation presents his own gift to those 
who hold the Feast.'' (13) 
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The mixing inherent among the various Algonkian 
bands gradually fostered the realization of shared traits 
and, often, interests. These similarities were illuminated 
even further by the obvious differences made apparent by 
the visits of other nations, particularly the Huron. The 
increased size of the trading units, which developed because 
of this congregation at the Sault, created the need for 
greater cooperation in trading excursions. All of these 
elements were combining to foster the growth of a larger 
sense of cultural affinity. 
The Ojibwa later needed this sense of commonality 
as a growing reliance on the fur trade created increased 
demands on traditional structures. These Algonkian bands 
had gradually become involved in the fur trade before direct 
contact with the French. The Hurons had been able to ex-
pand their aboriginal trading apparatus very efficiently 
and their strategic position between the western tribes 
and the French to allow them to distribute French goods 
for furs. 
This trade extended to the northern Algonkian 
bands, but before the mid-1600's it created few far ranging 
ramifications in either their economic activity or social, 
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religious life, In the first place, the route through 
which the fur trade was carried out was the long familiar 
one of barter with the Hurons. As described earlier, the 
Algonkians had long been engaged in trade with the Hurons. 
It was this already existing link which allowed the Huron 
to control the Great Lakes fur trade and to a certain ex-
tent erected them as a ©uffer between the potentially dis-
ruptive effects of European contact and the emerging Ojibwa 
culture in the north. The shape of the existing proto-
Ojibwa culture also helped temper the effects of the fur 
trade upon the Algonkian bands. With the exception of 
Sault Ste Marie, the bands were still an extremely scattered 
population. It was decades before many of the clan villages 
were to receive any significant input of European trade 
goods. 
Similarly the traditional round of economic 
activity fit well into the demands of the fur trade. For 
the relatively small number of skins needed in the early 
days of the trade, the family hunt group only needed to 
spend a little more time on hunting beaver during the 
winter months. As they became more efficient hunters due 
to the introduction of iron hatchets and arrow heads it 
did not mean a significant decrease in their harvest of 
moose and deer. There was no large scale cooperation 
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common during the winter months which could be disrupted 
by the demands of the fur trade. Thus it was only after 
the dispersal of the Huron in the mid-1600's and growing 
involvement in the fur trade that the changes wrought began 
to shake the traditional structures of northern Algonkian 
life, as well as providing the final impetus for the grow-
ing awareness of an Ojibwa commonality. 
Before we can understand the effects of this 
growing involvement in the fur trade, we need to delve a 
little deeper into the culture of the pre-contact Ojibwa. 
The often discussed Indian views on land ownership 
have, to a certain extent, created a common misconception 
of North American Indian society as one of Utopian social-
ism, in which each member got according to his needs. This 
is exactly that, a misconception, when discussing most 
native culture in Canada. It certainly is when viewing the 
Ojibwa. Ruth Landes in Ojibwa Sociology believes that early 
Ojibwa culture was more accurately described as "ruthless 
individualism". She goes on to explain: 
"All property ...• is held by individuals 
not by groups. Society can only ascertain 
the legality of the acquisition. Beyond that, 
society has no voice. Indeed, the individual 
is urged to do the furthest he likes, legally 
he cannot be criticized when, for example .... 
he refuses to tolerate needy families on rich 
hunting grounds." (14) 
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This obsession with the freedom of the individual 
pervaded all aspects of Ojibwa society. Whether scattered 
in the family hunting groups or congregated in their summer 
villages Ojibwa society was notable in its lack of social 
control structures. Indeed social conduct was inevitably 
"governed only by the conventional obligations of kin,"(l5) 
But even within kin groups members of the family were given 
almost complete autonomy. Young children were very quickly 
given the rights and responsibilities of adults and were 
expected to govern their conduct in a like manner. 
To the French and English this lack of authorit-
arianism was often unintelligible. Nicholas Perrot, report-
ing in the 1600's, was shocked that "the father does not 
venture authority over his sons, nor does the chief dare 
to give commands to his soldiers."(l 6 ) Indeed, not being 
able to understand this true freedom, both the French and 
the English helped perpetrate a further misconception, that 
of the Indian chief who ruled his people with a tempered 
firmness, which still exists today in popular depictions of 
Indian life. This type of chief was a rarity. An Ojibwa 
village would have had any number of elders responsible 
for various areas - war, oratory, etc. _(l?) but all this 
signified was that they were individuals noted for their 
skill or judgment in that particular area. If they ever 
proved ineffective they would no longer be consulted. 
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Ojibwa religion reflected this individual freedom. 
The Ojibwa had several varieties of shaman, and although the 
entreaties of a successful shaman would be very powerful he 
(or she) was only recognized as a mortal who had been 
granted a particular skill. Perhaps the most important 
event in determining the future of a young Ojibwa, and the 
most intense religious experience of his life, was the quest 
for a guardian spirit, Through fasting and hallucination 
the young Ojibwa hoped to attract the ministrations of a 
spirit out of nature. Much of the young Ojibwa's future 
success would depend on the power and dedication of this 
guardian spirit. Those who received a very special bless-
ing became shamans, either a waveno (leader) or 
(conjurer) or kugaeinchagy (seer).(iS) But the 
djishu 
success or 
failure at'all times depended upon the efforts or power or 
the individual and his helpers. 
The Ojibwa gods and spirits were in essence indivi-
duals also. Most Ojibwa believed in one supreme spirit who 
never became apparent but manifested himself through a host 
of subordinate spirits.(i9) These subordinate spirits were 
not mindless followers but individuals in their own right 
with their own special quirks and personalities. The sub-
ordinate spirits were responsible for imbuing all of nature 
with supernatural power and, ·as even nature was composed oi' 
unfettered indivuals, the Ojibwa was constantly bombarded 
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by attacks from the supernatural on all sides.( 20) 
Ojibwa society during this initial period then was 
a natural progression over the approximate one thousand 
years of the Late Woodland Cultural Development. What had 
developed was a society shaped and fitted around individual 
exertion, not only in economic pursuits but in social 
organization and spiritual fulfillment. A society in which 
"all the essential articles they used they made themselves, 
and all members of the group could perform the requisite 
tasks ... they were primarily self-sufficient and self-
contained ... (2l) 
This self-sufficiency helped create a society best 
termed atomistic, that is "one characterized by primary 
emphasis upon individual freedom and freedom from cultural 
restraints; reserve in inter-personal relations, lack of 
large scale organisms, weak and ineffectual leadership ... ( 22 ) 
But the excesses of this individualism were tempered by a 
pervading "kindness" throughout the group, by the feeling 
that one really was responsible for the welfare of those 
around him. Thus, although individual aggrandizement was 
perfectly within the bounds of 'legal'behaviour it certain-
ly was not the norm. 
It was this tY})e of society, moving gradually 
towards a shared group consciousness and involved on a 
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limited scale in the fur trade, which embarked on a period 
of accelerated cultural change, physical expansion and 
cultural fluorescence in the initial period of intense 
involvement in the fur trade. The immediate cause of this 
involvement was the loss of the Huron buffer through their 
dispersal in the early 1650's. 
CHAPTER 2 
HURONS 
The Coldwater-Narrows Indian Reserve was really a 
thin band joining two villages. This band ran from the 
narrows of Lake Couchiching and Lake Simcoe to Matchedash 
Bay (later Coldwater) on Lake Huron. As mentioned above, 
by the early and mid-1800's, when the reserve period began 
in Upper Canada, the Coldwater-Narrows area and most of the 
rest of Upper Canada was inhabited by Ojibwa or the closely 
allied Mississauga,, The Ojibwa were relative newcome::'s 
though, and the story of their occupation of Upper Canada 
from the head of Lake Superior is a long and involved one. 
The strip from Coldwater-Narrows ran through the 
middle of what had been, two hundred years earlier, the 
heart of Huron country, probably the most populous tribal 
alliance north of Mexico. The dispersal of these Huron 
tribes and the allied Petuns and Neutrals in the middle of 
the seventeenth century is arguably the most important single 
incident in Canadian history. Up until their dispersal the 
Huron had jealously guarded their position as brokers be-
tween the French and the Indian tribes to the west. It is 
clear that they could not have maintained this position 
indefinitely, but their absence after the dispersal none-
20 
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theless changed the shape of French-Indian interaction for 
many years to come, and might have even significantly 
altered the success of the English conquest of Canada one 
hundred years later. 
The Hurons had progressed through the same period 
of Late Woodland Culture earlier described, but their 
favourable geographic position and more fertile soil had 
created significantly different results than those for the 
more northerly Algonkian groups. Hurpn culture had developed 
around an intensive agricultural use of corn. This agric-
ultural base had allowed for proliferate population growth 
and the establishment of various fair sized towns as well 
as numerous villages, large in comparison to the Ojibwa kin 
group village. The Huron, although basing their economy on 
corn production, were not completely sedentary. Their vil-
lages were moved every few years as the fields around them 
became too depleted from the intensive planting and slash 
and burn clearing. The men still engaged in significant 
hunting, being absent from the village much of the year. 
Nonetheless the corn base allowed for a relative material 
prosperity and certainly a much greater security against the 
famine common among the northern Algonkians. Indeed, Hunt 
asserts that they had developed their a.gr"icul tural tech-
niques to such an extent that they could "keep on hand at 
all times a supply of corn sufficient for three or four 
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years"{i) in case of crop failure. 
The greater size of the village social unit and the 
ease of transportation and communication had resulted in 
the development of a rich community life. Tribal identity 
was highly developed. The sense of commonality with the 
other bands comprising the Huron nation was strong. Social 
organism was developed and complex. Ceremonial life was 
highly organized, ritualized and occurred on a large scale.( 2 ) 
Even before the fur trade, th·e surplus garnered 
through their agricultural pursuits and their well developed 
and effective social organisms had allowed for the develop-
ment of fairly extensive trading between the Hurons _and the 
tribes which surrounded them. As already indicated much 
of this trade was with the northern Algonkian bands, trading 
corn directly for Turs or meat. Their advantageous position 
on the edge of the northern hunting areas had also allowed 
them to develop a nascent role as middleman, exchanging 
such items as tobacco or copper which they received from 
the Iroquian Tobacco and Petun who surrounded them in the 
lower Great Lakes area for the produce of the northern 
forests. These trading activities had allowed the Huron 
to develop by the early 1600's formalized trading alliances 
and ceremonial ties which stretched surprising distances.()) 
2J 
As the French began to penetrate into Huronia, 
beginning in the second decade of the sixteenth century, 
the Hurons found themselves again in an advantageous 
position. Although the Lower Great Lakes area was not a 
particularly good trapping area for furs it struck through 
-i:le R.o,du M.os1- ,,[-k.J ...,..-.-J -1,, R.cc.c..l 
the better trapping grounds in the western lakes. Both 
the Ottawa river route and the way around the southern 
Great Lakes traversed through territory that for a signi-
ficant period of time was effectively controlled by the 
Huron. The Huron were able to use their already establish-
ed trading alliances, their highly developed sense of 
tribal identity and powerful social control organism, their 
valued surplus food base, abetted by a restrictive French 
trading policy which, for a period anyway, discouraged any 
interior penetration, to develop into the paramount French 
trading partner and the most powerful Indian nation in the 
Lower Great Lakes area. 
There is some debate among historians about just 
how deeply Huron life was affected by the fur trade. There 
is no doubt that, as had happened in other areas, initially 
the fur trade resulted in a sharp growth in the material 
prosperity of the Hurons. At the same time this material 
prosperity resulted in a flourishing of the ceremonial life, 
The need for larger cooperation in the increased size of 
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trading excursions also enhanced the authority of tradition-
al chiefs and clan leaders. 
G.T. Hunt, in The Wars of the Iroquois, asserts 
that the fur trade had even significantly affected the 
traditional Huron economic base: 
"It may be seen that the canny Hurons 
enjoyed an enviable position, merely exchanging 
the products of the economically captive Petuns 
and Neutrals for the true riches of the region. 
In this position it is not strange that they 
should have allowed their agricultural produc-
tion and provision for the future to wane,that 
they should have come to depend less and less 
upon their own crops for a food supply and to 
put by less against a day of want." (4) 
Recent research by Bruce Trigger has revealed a 
number of problems with this assertion by Hunt. He asserts 
that Hunt had a heightened concept of the Huron control of 
Petuns and Neutrals and that they were much freer to trade 
elsewhere then Hunt suggests. More importantly, Trigger 
argues convincingly that although the trading activities 
of the Huron increased, the majority of the Hurons still 
spent the vast bulk of their time on traditional farming 
pursuits. Thus he believes that agricultural production 
did not decrease significantly.(5) This g_uestion attains 
some significance when the reasons for the Huron's dispersal 
are discussed, and Trigger's research has placed a different 
slant on traditionally accepted explanations. 
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Early in the seventeenth century it had become 
obvious that the Huron position was going to place it in 
opposition to the also powerful Iroquois confederacy to 
the south. The Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk, had 
become inextricably involved in the fur trade, with first 
the Dutch and then the English traders at New York and 
Albany. Their increasing demand for more fur and the 
diminution of the beaver in their areas caused them to 
look covetously towards the rich fur lands in the western 
Great Lakes, the trade from which was controlled by the 
Huron. Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century 
the Iroquois had attempted to induce the Huron, using the 
incentive of cheaper goods, to trade their furs with the 
Iroquois, Although at times partially effective these 
treaties never held for any significant period of time, 
often because of the intrigues of the French who feared any 
Huron-Iroquois cooperation.( 6) These intervals of peace 
only temporarily interrupted long periods during which the 
Iroquois tried to blockade the trade routes to the French 
by conducting a series of raids designed to disrupt the 
Huron/French trade and to supply confiscated furs. But, as 
Hunt asserts, "These raids and ambushes, although they pro-
duced fur, produced a meager supply, wholly insufficient 
for Iroquois needs,''(?) 
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Consequently in the winter of 1649 the Iroquois 
joined forces to launch a large scale raid on the Huron 
villages, destroying one town and harassing the area for 
a period of time. It is not altogether clear whether the 
Iroquois were "an army of a thousand men with a single 
purpose," to push the Hurons out of Georgian Bay-Lake 
Simcoe region, as Hunt suggests,(S) or whether it was 
simply a raiding party, larger than usual to be sure, but 
with no clearer intentions than numerous similar raiding 
parties. Whatever its purpose, after causing little serious 
disruption, the party withdrew. 
What is amazing is the Hurons' reaction to this 
invasion. During the following year the Hurons, seemingly 
seized with panic, abandoned most of the Georgian Bay-Lake 
Simcoe area, eventually attaching themselves to other tribes, 
even joining the Iroquois, or followi~g Jesuit advice, 
perished from famine on overcrowded islands in Georgian Bay. 
These deaths and the disruption of perhaps forty thousand 
people(9) is one of history's great tragedies and mysteries. 
Hunt believes that the explanation for the Hurons' hasty 
withdrawal was the result of the disruption of the economy 
based on trading. 
"Such an economy would function very well 
so long as the complex and intricate tribal re-
lationships upon which it depended were undis-
turbed, but the complexity of the mechanism 
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made it fragile, and if it were shattered 
the result would be catastrophe ... in 1649 
to 1650 ... the finespun fabric of their com-
merce was torn apart by the storming Iroquois 
and, though losing few in battle, they 
starved by thousands," (10) 
and were rendered "capable of neither reason nor strategy",< 11 ) 
But Trigger, not accepting Hunt's hypothesis that the 
Hurons' agricultural base had earlier been abandoned, 
searched for more complex answers. His detailed history 
of the Huron, The Children of Aataenistic, describes 
painstakingly the intricacy of the Huron reactions. 
As Trigger asserts, Huron involvement in the fur 
trade, partial acceptance of Jesuit priests and suffering 
from the ravages of European ~iseases< 12 ) had seriously 
damaged the harmony of the traditional Huron society, 
Traditional authority was being seriously questioned, 
rivalry created between tribes and long held beliefs about 
the structure of the world around them were being 
questioned. The Huron no longer felt confident with the 
spiritual world that enveloped them and thus did not feel 
competent in dealing with the real world around them. It 
was this more than the disruption of their trading routes 
which caused the seeming panic in the Spring of 1650, 
Whatever the reasons, the Huron flight and the 
later dispersal of the Petuns and Neutrals by the Iroquois, 
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had by 1660 effectively depopulated the entire southern 
Great Lake-Georgian Bay area and cleared the way for the 
incredible expansion of the Ojibwa in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries and their direct involvement in 
the fur trade. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE FUR TRADE SURVIVES: OJIBWA EXPANSION 
At the time of the Huron dispersal in the mid-
seventeenth century the Ojibwa were limited to a narrow 
area around northern Lake Huron and Lake Superior. In the 
next one hundred years they were to occupy "a vast region 
in the centre of the continent ... (l) This region included, 
in the words of George Copway: 
"from Gananoque below Kingston; all 
western Canada; the north of Lake Huron; 
the north of Lake Superior; the north of 
Lake Winnipeg; the north of Red River Lake 
about one hundred miles. The whole extent 
comprises over 1900 miles east to west and 
200 to JOO miles north and south,"(2) 
The Ojibwa owed this unparallelled expansion to their 
effectiveness in adapting their traditional society and 
economic pursuits to the more intensive involvement in the 
fur trade demanded after the Huron dispersal. 
With their unexpected success against the Hurons, 
the Iroquois had hoped that they would be able to take 
control of the western fur trade, thus forcing the French 
to deal exclusively for furs with the Six Nations. But 
even as the Huron were dispersing the seeds for the new 
fur trade and Iroquois frustration were already being sown. 
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The Ottawa, with the assistance of a few fugitive 
Huron, had been able to assemble a fur fleet at Sault Ste 
Marie and in the spring of 1654 this fleet descended the 
Ottawa River. After the few sparse years following the 
Huron dispersal "the French were overjoyed at the sight of 
the canoes loaded with the precious beaver skins ... plenty 
and prosperity once more visited the colony. Canada re-
awoke to life and hope"(J) and the Ottawa traders were 
assured a profitable journey. Following this fur convoys 
again became a common sight on the Ottawa River, 
The Iroquois, realizing that their hopes of con-
trolling the western fur trade had been premature, l_aunched 
a major attack on the Ottawa and other western tribes in 
1656 and 1657, Their attack was not completely successful 
but they did create enough tension to prompt the Ojibwa to 
abandon Sault Ste Marie for a brief period and the Ottawa 
to abandon Manitoulin Island for a much longer period of 
time. 
They were not, however, able to stop the fur trade. 
Huron, Ottawa and Ojibwa were able continually to gather 
fur brigades in the villages around western Lake Huron and 
Lake Superior and to squeeze through the net of raiders the 
Iroquois had suspended over the Ottawa River. By the 1660's 
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the Iroquois power had begun to wane. Decimated by a 
plague in 1662 and weakened by warfare with the Susqua-
hannas to the south, they were finally defeated by a large 
force of Ojibwa, Ottawa and Pottawatomis (the Council of 
Three Fires). The major battle occurred at Lake Simcoe.( 4) 
This and later minor defeats eventually resulted in the 
Iroquois withdrawal to the south of Lake Ontario. 
By this time the Ojibwa were just beginning to 
develop that strength and power that they were to demonstrate 
throughout the following decades. Until now the Ottawa had 
been the major traders in the revised fur trade, The 
Ojibwa, when not threatened by the Iroquois, were able to 
supply their somewhat modest need for European trade goods 
through trapping and hunting in their traditional winter 
hunt camps. But, gradually, through their contacts in the 
growing summer villages, their demand for trade goods in-
creased. At approximately the same time, the more efficient 
hunting techniques and increase in economic prosperity 
brought about by the introduction of iron trade goods helped 
foster a significant increase in population. Both of these 
factors combined to put a strain on the resources of the 
traditional hunting areas, which in turn prompted the 
beginning of the Ojibwa "career of expansion".(5) 
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The initial avenue of expansion for the Ojibwa was 
into the rich fur areas of present day Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. The bulk of this expansion occurred between 
1680 and 1700.( 6 ) The mode of expansion was primarily that 
of pioneering kin village groups. Old villages, finding 
land pressure intense and a scarcity of fur animals in the 
area, would foster kin groups venturing out to form 
satellite villages which would, initially at least, maintain 
their ties with the old village,(?) 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century the 
Ojibwa had completed the bulk of their westward expansion, 
occupying most of the western Great Lake region, forcing 
their way into areas which brought them into conflict with 
numerous other peoples and creating significant changes in 
Ojibwa social systems. As was discussed in the earlier 
chapter, intense involvement in the fur trade did not 
completely disrupt the traditional round of economic acti-
vity for the Ojibwa. Probably the greatest change occurred 
in the structuring of interpersonal relations and group 
decisions. Although most Ojibwa were involved as primary 
producers for the fur trade, they were beginning to spend 
their summers in large trading towns scattered around the 
Great Lakes. These towns, Green Bay, Chag_uemaguon, Arbre 
Coche and Michilimacinac, of which Sault Ste Marie was a 
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prototype, played an important role in widening Ojibwa 
interpersonal contacts. Unlike the former summer villages, 
composed of one clan all members of which could trace their 
ancestors back to a common totem, these trading towns, like 
Sault Ste Marie, were multi-clan villages. This implied 
great changes in social political structure. In the smaller 
villages the scope for communal enterprise was limited and 
any that were undertaken were easily organized by the clan 
elders. In the new towns, the demands on the structures 
were much greater. The business of outfitting trading 
caravans, co-ordinating defense against the Ojibwa's now 
numerous enemies and dispensing justice in large town 
composed of not only numerous clans but also different 
tribal groups, demanded more effective leadership than 
Ojibwa society was originally able to furnish.(B) 
The Ojibwa were able to adopt two different abori-
ginal concepts to supply this needed direction. Initially 
the power of various paramount chiefs was recognized and 
they were given more authority than was usual. But the 
most effective way of ensuring cooperation throughout the 
tribal entity was the greater significance given to totemic 
clans.(9) By using the totemic clan concept, Ojibwa village 
groups were able to develop a feeling of kin association 
with other village groups which traced their ancestry through 
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the same traditional totem. This simple process not only 
aided in developing a community of interests among the 
Ojibwa located in the large trading towns, but also 
supplied an effective framework around which to structure 
civil authority. 
The other aboriginal concept that the Ojibwa 
adapted to the increasing scope of Ojibwa communities was 
the Midiwewin. In the words of Hickerson, the Midiwewin 
was 
"an organized priesthood of men and 
women who had occult knowledge of killing 
and curing by use of herbs, missiles, 
medicine bunches and other objects which 
had medicinal properties ... [Its members] 
were repositories of tribal traditions, 
origins and migrations integrated in sys-
tems of myths and legends."(10) 
There is some question about how aboriginal the 
Midiwewin society was. It is possible that it was the 
result of an amalgamation of borrowings from the other 
tribes the Ojibwa were associating with in the western 
Great Lakes and a partial mimicry of the priests the 
Ojibwa were now accustomed to seeing. It is most probable 
though that the Midiwewin was an aboriginal concept which 
saw growth in both its siz,e and power due to the demands 
now being placed on it by the larger Ojibwa communities. 
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In a society where controlling the spirits and 
living in harmony with them were deemed to be of supreme 
importance in maintaining order and stability, it was to 
be expected that the growth of Ojibwa society would place 
demands on the traditional means of maintaining this order. 
The growth of the Midiwewin society not only supplied the 
Ojibwa with a more powerful force in ·dealing with any 
possible threats from all those elements of nature imbued 
with the power of aiding or hampering the efforts of man, 
but also developed as a powerful organism where all sub-
jects of importance to Ojibwa society could be discussed 
and affirmative action decided upon. 
By the 1720's the Ojibwa were at the height of 
their economic prosperity and cultural fluorescence, They 
had been able to maintain a large degree of autonomy, had 
resisted Christian teaching and had developed an efficient 
means of exploiting not only the fur trade but their 
position between the traders and those more western tribes 
which desired trade goods and now had to approach the 
Ojibwa for them. Their position and power allowed them to 
begin to feel superior to many of the other less powerful 
tribes around the Upper Great Lakes, and they certainly 
felt themselves superior to the French who were among them. 
This is hardly surprising. 
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"The coureurs de bois often committed a 
thousand base acts with the savages in order 
to obtain their beaver skins; they followed 
them even on their hunting expeditions and 
did not even give them time to dry and prepare 
their pelts. They endured the stinging jeers, 
the contempt, and sometimes the blows of these 
savages who were lost in wonder at covetous-
ness so sordid, and at seeing the French come 
from so great a distance with so much fatigue 
and foul smelling beaver skins, with which 
they had clothed themselves and which they 
no longer needed." (11) 
After the 1720's their position began to change 
slowly. The French policy towards the fur trade had 
shifted to one encouraging expansion and_ exploration. (12 ) 
Despite efforts by the Ojibwa the French began to develop 
contacts with the tribes to the west of the Great Lakes 
and the Ojibwa (and Ottawa) began slowly to lose their 
favourable position as middlemen, 
The Ojibwa situation was still enviable enough 
though. Despite losing their middleman role they continued 
to control valuable fur hunting grounds. Trading had never 
completely disrupted their trapping pursuits. As the 
French began to by-pass the Ojibwa this economic pursuit 
was simply strengthened. As a result, Ojibwa economic 
prosperity was reduced slightly but, more significantly, 
the role of the western trading towns seriously declined. 
With this decline there was a noted dispersal of bands and 
clans. The hunting band again became the basic socio-
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economic unit(l3) and the smaller summer villages became 
the norm once more, 
The primary difference between the old and new 
villages was that these small villages and even the smaller 
hunting bands had developed into multi-clan organisms in 
'which the members traced their ancestry back to different 
totems. Indeed there is even some indication that by this 
point the totem had become a social grouping not directly 
tied to a belief in shared ancestry .. Consequently individ-
ual Ojibwa occasionally transferred their allegiance from 
one totem clan to another if this was perceived as en-
hancing their status. The small villages were no longer 
held together by shared ancestry but by their consciousness 
of a proud tribal heritage while the totemic clans helped 
maintain a sense of commonality throughout the Ojibwa 
nation and provided a structured framework around which 
communal pursuits could be organized, 
Despite losing their role as middleman the Ojibwa 
remained effective exploiters of the fur trade. Other Upper 
Great Lakes tribes, Ottawa and Pottawatomi, having lost 
middleman roles, began to emulate the Ojibwa culture. Thus 
"by 1760 there had arisen in the Upper 
Great Lakes region a uniformity of tribal 
culture ... developed in the direction of the 
Chippewa culture-type." (14) 
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Since the days of the early congregations of groups 
around the narrows at Sault Ste Marie, the northern Algon-
kian bands had travelled through three stages of social 
development, From the auto"nomous patri-lineal descent 
groups immediately following the Late Woodland Culture, they 
had, responding to the demands of the fur trade, shifted 
their primary organization to multi-clan political trading 
villages on the lakes. As the Ojibwa lost their role as 
middleman political and social organization again shifted 
back to a smaller scale, but now to composite hunting bands 
with Ojibwa-group consciousness. 
Throughout it all the Ojibwa had withstood the 
potential destructiveness of the fur trade relatively well. 
Despite the occasional "seasons of scarcity and want"(l5) 
the fur trade had allowed for significant economic prosper-
ity while still allowing the Ojibwa to remain relatively 
self-reliant. They had, for the most part, steadfastly 
resisted Christian teachings and despite the increasing use 
of alcohol as a trade item were not yet experiencing the 
great disruptions "demon rum" was later to play on Ojibwa 
society. Because of their more scattered existence and 
little direct contact with white traders the Ojibwa suffered 
less from the ravages of Eurpean diseases than the Huron 
before them. In short, while the fur trade had helped 
foster the growth of Ojibwa tribal consciousness it had 
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not yet caused the lack of confidence in the traditional 
society that had played such an important part in the Huron 
disintegration. 
CHAPTER 4 
OJIBWA EXPANSION INTO THE SOUTHERN GREAT LAKES REGION 
A significant part of the Ojibwa expansion did not 
follow the general westward trend. East of the Saulteur 
around the head cf Lake Huron a number of autonomous bands 
lived, following the general life style of limited involve-
ment in the fur trade described earlier. During the middle 
years of the seventeenth century, when Iroquois power was 
at its zenith, these bands were forced northward, eventually 
coming to rest in the Keenan Peninsula north of Lake 
Superior. The tremendous disruption caused by this forced 
migration, the need for a common defence and the increasing 
involvement in the fur trade combined to inculcate the 
group solidarity and expansion of cultural ties discussed 
earlier. By the late 1660's and early 1670's, when they 
began gradually to move southward again, these bands had 
also developed multi-clan villages and a sense of shared 
cultural traits as a result of this congregation and sub-
sequent dispersion. 
Three of the bands, the Achiligouiane, the Amicoure 
and the Mississauga had been removed enough from the main 
flow of Ojibwa cultural affiliations to maintain their 
autonomy and, to a certain extent, have remained separate, 
as the Mississauga, to this day. The tribal division 
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between the Mississauga and Ojibwa proper has always been 
obscure. There is little cultural differentiation and 
throughout the period individual Indians were easily 
moving from one group to the other. Fbr the purpose of 
this paper then, subsequent discussions will not differen-
tiate between the Mississauga and the Ojibwa. 
There is some debate about the exact dates of this 
Ojibwa migration south, but the prevailing opinion, and the 
one Donald Smith adheres to, after a thorough study, is 
that this migration began as early as 1666,( 1 ) shortly 
after the Iroquois had ceased their periodic forays into 
the Georgian Bay area. As the Iroquois power continued 
to diminish, evidenced by their defeats by the Council of 
Three Fires during the latter half of the seventeenth 
century, the Ojibwa expansion southward continued. After 
the dramatic defeat of the Iroquois in the 1690's they 
agreed to Ojibwa control of the Great Lakes area to the 
north shore of Lake Ontario and a free fur trade route to 
the English at Albany.( 2 ) As early as 1710 
were planting corn in the area west of Lake 
the Ojibwa 
Simcoe(J) 
by 1720 were firmly established throughout the entire 
southern Great Lakes area. 
and 
Although reports of the Ojibwa planting corn in 
Southern Ontario indicate that they were able to take ad-
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vantage of the increased fertility of their new homes in 
the Southern Great Lakes area to become involved in 
agriculture it never achieved the significance for the Ojibwa 
that it had for the Huron. Their involvement was, for the 
most part, restricted to a brief period of planting in the 
spring. The fields would then be abandoned while the 
Ojibwa dispersed to hunt or travel to fishing grounds. In 
the fall they would return to harvest what corn had sur-
vived the ravages of pests and weeds. 
For the most part the Ojibwa in the Southern Great 
Lakes area were hunters. They engaged in the traditional 
round of Ojibwa seasonal activities, as well as concentrat-
ing a significant amount of their energies on trapping and 
hunting for the fur trade. They were not able to engage 
to any extent in the middleman role other Algonkian groups 
farther west were able to, or as the Huron had when they 
occupied a similar position. The Ojibwa lacked the wide-
spread trading contacts the Huron had enjoyed, and by now 
the French had long since by-passed the Southern Great 
Lakes area, doing their trading in the rich fur lands 
further west. 
Competition between the French and British for the 
furs of the area, though, allowed these Ojibwa to command 
significant solicitation and assistance from the French. 
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The Ojibwa were able to trade freely with the British at 
Albany, assured of an unmolested passage through the 
-
Iroquois by the agreement in the late 1690's. Despite the 
construction of the French fort at Niagara in 1721 in an 
attempt to intercept this trade the Ojibwa were able, until 
the 1740's, to play the two colonial powers off against one 
another. This position of power, enhanced by the knowledge 
that their furs were important enough for unlicensed traders 
(coureurs de bois) to seek them out in their hunt camps 
enduring the contempt of the Indians and "the miserable life" 
inherent in the trade,( 4 ) maintained in the Ojibwa a sense 
of superiority over the white man which forced the French 
for the most part to act in a solicitous and humble manner 
among the Indians. 
It was partly this belief in their superiority, 
coupled with the effective way traditional life styles and 
beliefs were coping with the new demands of the fur trade, 
that prompted the Ojibwa to reject Christian teaching. The 
frustration of the Jesuit and other Catholic missionaries, 
accustomed to their success with the Huron and limited 
success with other more eastern Algonkian groups, was 
expressed by Abb{Pacquet in 1751, He claimed the Ojibwa 
had ''never shown the least zeal for religion, on the con-
trary they had been much opposed to it."(5) 
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In the early 1700's, although not g_uite so rich as 
their western cousins, Ojibwa in the Southern Great Lakes 
region flourished and their relatively new found pride in 
the history of the Ojibwa people provided a constant source 
of entertainment during their abundant leisure time. 
According to Pouchot -
"The Indians are not altogether occupied 
by the chase when in their villages. They 
neither hunt nor fish except to live. During 
the sojourn that they make, they assemble in 
their cabins •.. where with calumet in mouth 
they discuss their politics and rehearse the 
history of their nation." (6) 
Indeed Ojibwa life in the early part of the eight-
eenth century was colourful and exciting. Even their dress 
reflected this vibrancy. At the close of this period 
Alexander Henry, an Englishman, aided by Ojibwa friends 
was trying to escape detection by passing as an Ojibwa. 
This is how they effected the transformation (it is worth 
quoting at length for the vivid picture it portrays of 
Ojibway dress); 
"My hair was cut off and my head shaved, 
with the exception of a spot on the crown of 
about twice the diameter of a crown piece. 
My face was painted with three or four different 
colours, some parts of it red, others black. A 
shirt was provided for me, painted with vermillion 
and mixed with grease. A large collar of wampum 
was put around my neck and another suspended in 
my breast. Both my arms were decorated with 
large bands of silver above the elbow, besides 
several smaller ones on the wrists, and my 
legs were covered with mitasses (leggings) 
a kind of hose made, as is the favorite 
fashion, of scarlet cloth. Over all I 
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was to wear a scarlet blanket, or mantle, (?) 
and on my head a large bunch of feathers." 
As in all other parts of Canada though, the Ojibwa 
in the Southern Great Lakes area were not to benefit from 
the fur trade in the long run. Even during the best days 
of the trade the Ojibwa were never able to accumulate much 
from their efforts. Alexander Henry, during his life as an 
Ojibwa, discovered that after a full season of successful 
hunting he had gained about one hundred and sixty dollars 
and on "inquiring into the price of goods I found that all 
my funds would not go far."(S) 
One of the biggest problems of the fur trade, how-
ever, was the growing Ojibwa addiction to the alcohol traders 
used to attract the Indian and increase their profits. 
According to Pouchot: 
"Brandy is, without doubt, the thing of 
all others that the Indian loves the best .•. 
It is a means for attracting whole nations 
and has become an object of too great a commerce. 
Although they would not now consent to be de-
prived of this pernicious lig_uor they are 
nevertheless very much ashamed of having 
become accustomed to it, and regard its use 
as the principal cause of their ruin."(9) 
Indeed Frank Severance believed that it was only by the 
"brandy distributed wi.thout measure" that the French were 
(10) able to attract the Indians to their posts. 
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The increasing use of brandy held serious portent 
for the Ojibwa. With the encouragement of French traders 
many Indians, after a long winter's trapping, found they 
had laboured the whole season for a few days of drunken 
revelry. They would have little left to stake themselves 
for another season of trapping and, as they were now in-
creasingly unable to meet their expanding needs in tradi-
tional ways, many Ojibwa were forced into perpetuating 
debt to various traders. 
Near the end'of the French period in Canada it 
became obvious that the biggest problem the Ojibwa faced 
due to their involvement in the fur trade was the growing 
dependence upon imputs of European goods. 
The continuing antagonism between the two colonial 
powers in North America finally came to a head around the 
middle of the eighteenth century. When Louisburg fell in 
1746 it became increasingly difficult for the French to 
equip their posts with supplies for the fur trade. This 
restriction had a disastrous effect on the Ojibwa and en-
raged them to such an extent that portions of them, 
particularly the Mississauga who by now were developing 
closer ties with the Iroquois, attacked the French posts 
in the west. Although the Ojibwa stopped their hostilities 
in 17L1,8, ( 11 ) the fall of Louisburg marked the beginning of 
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more than a decade of extreme scarcity which only abated 
with the surrender of Quebec on 8 September 1760.( 12 ) 
During the war, and despite their earlier hostility, 
the Ojibwa fought on the side of the French although the 
French viewed them as very unreliable allies.(iJ) As the 
tides of war continued to go against the French, the 
supplies available for the allied Indians became increasing-
ly scarce until near the end of the war the Southern 
Ojibwa were forced to petition Pouchot at Fort Niagara: 
"Father we need your pity, we have no 
longer any ammunition, nor anything to cover 
us since we lost you. We hope you will have 
pity on us. Our people will all die this 
winter." ( 14) 
The conquest of Canada by the British had serious 
consequences for the Ojibwa in the Southern Great Lakes 
area, as it did for all Indians in Canada, but perhaps its 
greatest lesson was the realization it brought that the 
Ojibwa was no longer independent. They could no longer 
supply themselves with the materials they now needed to 
survive and henceforth must depend on the European for that 
survival. Many Ojibwa no doubt recognized this as did M. 
PouchoT-, the French Commander at Niagara during the war. 
His final thoughts on the Ojibwa as he departed following 
the surrender 
we came among 
of the post began with "To their misfortune 
them." (l5) 
CHAPTER 5 
THE BRITISH TRADE IN SOUTHERN GREAT LAKES - 1760-1800 
The defeat of the French by Britain in 1760, and 
the conse~uent assumption of authority by the British over 
the area brought important changes to the Ojibwa in Upper 
Canada. The British were more interested in encouraging 
settlement in the Great Lakes area and, with French with-
drawal the Ojibwa no longer had competing colonial powers 
interested in maintaining their affections. 
Initially it was business as usual. Following the 
fall of Quebec in 1760, while the British were still 
scrambling to occupy French posts, traders were already 
making their way west.( 1 ) It was these traders through 
whom, for almost the next four decades, Ojibwa~white contact 
would be maintained and upon whom the bulk of the Ojibwa 
would depend for a significant element in their survival. 
Thus it is important to come to some understanding of what 
type of men these were and what sort of relations the 
Ojibwa had with them. 
By all accounts the traders were the least desir-
able of the English and French in the new world. Mcillwain 
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calls the Indian trader "the very scum of the earth" and 
decries "their treatment of the Indians .•. as hardly suit-
able to description ... ( 2 ) A trader in Toronto in the early 
1770's leaves us this colourful account of his partner: 
" ... on the whole he is one of the most 
lazy, indolent young fellows I ever saw. 
The whole winter he sat at the fire side with 
his elbow on his knee and his chin in his 
hand picking his nose without speaking a 
word. He has wore a shirt 13 or 14 weeks 
without changing it the whole time, I don •,t 
think he ever washed. When he took his 
shirt off it swarmed with lice."(3) 
Perhaps the best example of the relationships be-
tween the Ojibwa and traders who proliferated around them 
can be found in the story of David Ramsay. Ramsay was an 
unlicensed trader who had set up shop north of Lake Ontario 
in 1771 and was later arrested for the murder of a nwnber 
of Indians. In Ramsay's account of his murders he told 
Sir William Johnson, superintendent of the Indian Department, 
that he had been continually harassed by Indians who boasted 
of the Englishmen they had killed and took goods from him 
with no hope or thought of paying them back. Ramsay was 
eventually kidnapped by a group of Indians, and according 
to him, he killed them while escaping. An indication of 
Ramsay's opinion of the Indians with whom he traded was his 
own account that he chewed the lead shot before loading his 
gun as he felt it a shame to kill an Indian with a smooth 
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ball. ( 4) 
Part of the reason for the hostile relations be-
tween the traders and the Indians was the main trade item, 
alcohol. The same merchant who provided us with the 
colourful description earlier also wrote Sir W. Johnson 
in£orming him that they had just received a large supply of 
rum without which "we would lose all our spring trade ... (5) 
This trade in rum and the effects it had on the 
Indian often resulted in hostility and violence between the 
traders and their suppliers. Sir W. Johnson told Lord 
Bathurst in a letter 
"of the fatal effects of rum ... I have 
just received a fresh instance in the murder 
of a trader and his servants on Lake Huron 
by some of the Nation whose people were killed 
by Ramsay. The traders sold them rum and 
neglecting to leave them, tho' advised by 
themselves to do so, on being refused more 
liquor they seized it, got intoxicated, a 
sauabble ensued which resulted in the death 
oi the trader and his servants."(6) 
Of course the deteriorating relations between the 
traders and Indians did not escape the notice of Indian 
Department officials. Sir W. Johnson, who became chief 
superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern District 
in 1755, when the Indians, particularly the Iroquois had 
significant power and could do much harm to British inter-
ests, retained his belief in the need to pacify the Indians 
and keep them loyal to the British cause. Sir William was 
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followed by Colonel Guy Johnson and, in 1782, by John 
Johnson. Sir William's followers believed wholeheartedly 
in his system and were equally impressed with the need to 
retain the good will of the Indians. The fur trade brought 
in approximately two hundred thousand pounds sterling 
annually(?) and, although the conquest of Canada had re-
moved much of the immediate French threat, the French 
retained their trade in the far west down the Mississippi. 
Johnson was continually regaled with stories about French 
intrigues in the area designed •to render us odious to the 
Indians ... ( 8 ) The continued resistance around the western 
Great Lakes by various Indian groups under the nominal 
leadership of the Ottawa, Pontiac, only served to heighten 
this apprehension. Of course, during and after the American 
Revolution the British had further cause to fear alienating 
the Indians of the Great Lakes area. 
General Haldimand probably best summed up British 
feeling when in 1776 he agreed with Guy Johnson that "the 
friendship and active alliance of the Indians must be pre-
served at any cost, for if they do us no good they may do 
us much harm."(9) The officials of the Indian Department 
were fully aware of the great extent and power of the 
Ojibwa nation. William Johnson wrote to the Earl of Hills-
boro in 1768 affirming that the Ojibwa were "the most 
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powerful nation to the westward." Not only could they 
make or break the British fur trade but he personally knew 
an Ojibwa chief "a man of much influence [who] can bring 
some thousands of his people into the field."(!O) 
Realizing the importance of maintaining the loyal-
ty of the Ojibwa, the continuing misadventures of the 
traders infuriated and worried Johnson and other Indian 
Department officials. Johnson wrote to General Gage as 
early as 1767 declaring that the Indians "are daily abused 
but there is no preventing it without proper authority."(ii) 
Gage, sensitive to the problem, immediately replied to 
Johnson that 
"I am quite sensible of the irregular 
behaviour of the traders and have intimated 
to His Majesty's Secretary of State ... that 
they must be restricted by law and a judicial 
power invested in the officers commanding at 
the posts to see such law put in force."(12) 
Following these communications the government instituted a 
system of government storekeepers responsible for trade at 
all the posts. Post commanders were given greater author-
ity in dealing with traders and government ships were to 
be used to transport furs and supplies. 
Despite these measures, unlicensed and licensed 
traders continued to mistreat the Indians and Johnson con-
tinued to insist that further restrictions be enforced. The 
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Earl of Dartsmouth replied to one of Johnson's requests in 
September of 1772: 
"The manner in which you express your-
self on the subject of the present temper 
and disposition of the Indian leaves but 
little room to doubt that if some method is 
not soon fallen upon to restrain the number-
less frauds and abuses which are at present 
committed by those who carry on trade and 
have intercourse with them, we shall be in-
volved in an Indian war," (13) 
But he later admitted that "there is not sufficient 
authority in the Crown for the execution of such a plan ... (14) 
One of the problems in any system of regulating 
trade that could be devised was that the French traders 
were continually representing to the government officials 
that the restrictions imposed were intended to eliminate 
them from the trade to the advantage of the English traders 
in Albany and in Montreal, Johnson repeatedly denied that 
the traders were being discriminated against and hotly 
replied to Carleton in 1767 that "in fact the traders, 
both English and French, but particularly the latter, do 
as they please ... ( 15) Nonetheless these petitions continued 
to help restrain any plans that the Indian Department could 
sponsor to restrict traders in the Great Lakes area. 
Perhaps the best indication of how ineffective these 
restrictions were is again the case of David Ramsay. Before 
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his arrest for murder, Ramsay had been taken into custody 
by Captain Brown, the Commanding Officer at Niagara. He 
was sent away to Quebec, but despite the fact that he was 
obviously an unlicensed, thus illegal, trader, he very 
quickly was back with the Ojibwa north of Lake Ontario, 
where he eventually committed his murders. And yet the 
Indian Department's hands were tied. After Ramsay was 
arrested he was sent to Quebec for trial, but Johnson pre-
dicted that 
"(as is usual on such occasions) the ' 
Interest with which his Creditrs will make 
with those who are his Jurors, and the 
Prejudices of the Commonalty against Indians 
will probably prove the means of his being 
acquitted, altho' he makes use of Threats 
that he will do much more mischief when en-
larged." (16) 
Obviously the government was going to have a 
difficult time controlling these traders and could not hope 
to use them as agents to foster the British tie. Most 
members of the British colonial government in Canada 
believed the maintenance of this tie to be of extreme 
importance. Bearing in mind the inability of the fur trade 
to strengthen Indian allegiance to the British they relied 
upon a system of annual presents to help ensure that 
loyalty, keep them trading at British forts and, in later 
years particularly, as payment for services done in battle 
for the British crown. 
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Immediately following the British defeat of the 
French the British General, Amherst, emphasizing economy, 
withdrew the funding for the bulk of these presents. Sir 
William Johnson fought bitterly against this action be-
lieving that 
"the reduction of Officers and Retrench-
ment of Expenses in the Indian Department has 
already been represented by their (Spanish 
and French in the west) Agents as Instances 
of our Parsimony; Neglect and Contempt." (17) 
Although the resistance of the allied western tribes under 
Pontiac partly caused by the reduction in presents proved 
Johnson's fears, the presents remained on a limited scale 
until the growing antagonism of the northern colonies 
prompted the British government to change its course. 
During and after the War of Independence it was the policy 
of the British Government to attract as many Indians from 
the Great Lakes region to the British forces as possible,(lB) 
To do this they were forced to increase significantly the 
presents they handed out, both to attract American Indians 
and to keep up the reward implicitly promis'.ld the Indians 
who fought on the British side. These presents eventually 
became a significant annual expense to the British govern-
ment. Despite continued schemes and suggestions concerning 
ways in which this expense could be reduced (such as that 
by Deputy Superintendent William Claus in 1777 that the 
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presents be given only as the occasional reward "or the 
Indians will expect them as their due,"(l9)) the Indians 
did indeed come to expect them and the Indian Department 
found it increasingly difficult to reduce them. Conse-
quently between 1813 and 1816 approximately one hundred and 
fifty thousand pounds sterling worth of presents were dis-
tributed annually.(ZO) The vast bulk of this went to 
Indians in the Great Lakes area. 
The Ojibwa had come to depend on these presents for 
a significant portion of their trade goods. Their hunting 
grounds were no longer able to supply the huge quantity of 
furs necessary to appease their growing appetite for 
European goods. But the Indians knew the British fears and 
were becoming expert at playing on them to prompt Indian 
official largesse through veiled and sometimes outright 
threats. 
In 1767 Wabacommegat, an Ojibwa chief from north of 
Lake Ontario, approached Johnson with this recrimination: 
"Now Brethren, it's a shame that this 
should be the only post where the Indians have 
no presents; in the posts up the country they 
get everything they want in great abundance. 
I hope, therefore, you will not do as you did 
last time I was at this place, which was to 
give me only about as much powder as would load 
my firelock. I am ashamed to return home and 
tell my young people I have been well received 
by my Brothers, the English always take care of 
us and use us well, and at the same time I 
have not so much as one load of powder and 
shott to give them to show our Bretherns 
have been kind to us." (21) 
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Wabacommegat was careful to precede these remarks 
with a story of how the Shawnee had sent them a "Bad Belt" 
(an invitation to war) but that the Ojibwa had refused it 
out of loyalty to the British and, of course, were now 
expecting their just rewards. Indeed, throughout the 
latter part of the 1700's Johnson and his successors were 
deluged with stories of 'Bad Belts' being passed from tribe 
to tribe, often from chiefs expecting an acceptable token 
of appreciation from the British. 
Despite the presents the Indians in the Great Lakes 
were not prospering. The throwing together of various 
tribes and bands within the restricted area of the southern 
Great Lakes had created severe tension and unease among the 
tribes, Traditional means of governing inter-tribal re-
lations were no longer working. At the same council in 
1767 Wabacommegat gave Johnson a partial picture of this 
unrest. 
"The Poutawatamis of St. Joseph were still 
drunk and doing mischief wherever they went to, 
that Saquinas had killed a young Huron, that 
the Saquinas had sent a Belt to the Hurons to 
try to make a reconitiation (sic) for the mur-
der, that the Huron had received the Belt but 
would not make answer to it, that the Indians 
around Detroit had very bad hearts." (22) 
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Increasing the unease and disorientation felt by 
the Indians in the Great Lakes area, periodic epidemics 
continued to sweep the Indian villages. Simcoe's Diary 
of his visit to Lake le Claie (Lake Simcoe) in 1793 tells 
us of whole families being too sick to travel to their 
winter hunting grounds and of bands losing their most 
respected and venerated elders, as well as their best 
hunters. ( 23) 
The most disruptive aspects of the changing world 
of the Ojibwa in the Great Lakes area continued to be the 
effects of alcohol on their health and society. The 
Ojibwa seldom benefitted from the presents they received, 
generally transferring them to waiting traders for a gallon 
or so of cheap English rum. Despite attempts on the part 
of the Indian Department to control these traders, they 
were almost always present during or shortly after the 
distribution of presents. John Cameron reported to Simcoe 
in 1806 that many of the Indians "return to the woods in 
much worse circumstances than when they left them ... ( 24 ) 
The Indian Department itself was responsible for 
much of this growing addiction. Despite their attempts to 
control the use of rum by traders, department officials 
continually supplied barrels of rum at the presentacion of 
presents and at Indian c.ounciJ.s despite the pleas of "the 
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Chiefs of several Nations ... (25) Brigadier General McLean, 
after watching the fort of Niagara dispense four hundred 
and twenty-two gallons of rum in sixteen days, observed 
"it appears to me that the people at the 
head of the Indian Department seem to vie with 
each other who shall expend most rum and the 
great chiefs are striving who shall drink most 
rum." ( 26) 
This situation could not continue much longer. 
It was obvious that Indian society in the Great Lakes area 
was no longer able to cope with the pressures thrust upon 
it. Even the most casual observers were able to perceive 
the debilitated state of the Indians. One such observer, 
a traveller passing through Upper Canada in 1795, remarked: 
" ... this race of men are gradually 
wasting away ... the intemperate use of strong 
liquors continue to enervate them. The 
savage returning from an expedition benumbed 
with cold and enfeebled by fatigue would 
barter the world for a gallon of rum. " ( 27) . 
Throughout this period Indian Department officials 
were obsessed with maintaining the Indian as an ally in 
war and as the bottom rung of an economy based on the fur 
trade. Although they attempted, ineffectually, to control 
the most blatant outrages of the traders, their primary 
interest in doing so was to maintain the Indian's allegi-
ance. Nobody within the Indian Department was able, at 
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least until well after the turn of the century, to foresee 
any other role for the Ojibwa in the Great Lakes area. 
i !, 
CHAPTER 6 
INDIAN LAND SURRENDERS IN UPPER CANADA 
Of course the final degradation for the Indians of 
Upper Canada was the loss of their lands. Even at its 
worst, alcohol only got its grip on some of the Ojibwa. 
When they were most rampant disease epidemics always left 
a certain percentage alive and well. But one plague con-
tinued to pour into Upper Canada that no Ojibwa was able 
to resist forever - settlers. 
Even before the conquest of Canada English settlers 
in the colonies to the south were beginning to search else-
where for cheap agricultural land. After the British 
victory a logical arena for their exertions was the Southern 
Great Lakes area, In the years immediately following 1760 
this pressure was directed mainly at the Niagara frontier. 
The type of tense relations which were to typify 
English/Ojibwa negotiations concerning land immediately 
became evident here. Almost before the smoke had cleared, 
in 1761, General Amherst had given certain traders leave to 
settle and clear land near Niagara. This liberty was viewed 
with much distrust by the Ojibwa who claimed the area as 
hunting grounds. They indignantly complained to Superin-
tendent Johnson who, in turn, penned this warning to Amherst: 
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"I see plainly that there appears to be 
a universal jealousy amongst every nation, on 
account of the hasty steps they look upon we 
are taking towards getting possession of this 
country, which I am certain will never subside 
whilst we encroach within the limits which you 
may recollect have been put under the protec-
tion of the King in the year 1726, and con-
firmed to them by him and his successors ever 
since. " ( 1 ) 
The protection Johnson speaks of was again con-
firmed by the Crown in the Proclamation of 1763, reserving 
significant portions of land for Indian use and indirectly 
confirming their ownership of all land not surrendered, 
The Indian Department and Crown officials in the Southern 
Great Lakes area were caught in the dilemna of trying to 
appease two conflicting interests. More and more settlers 
were clamouring for land, but at the same time the Indian 
Department officials were always cognizant of the need to 
maintain good relations with the Indians who resisted any 
encroachment. The solution seemed obvious to the English, 
imbued with their concept of land ownership and assured 
that there was a just or unjust price for anything, they 
would purchase the land from the Indian. 
They wasted little time obtaining their first 
block of land around the Niagara River from the Ojibwa in 
1764.( 2 ) For the next two decades, although the Great 
Lakes area remained Indian country, and c.ivi1/military 
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authority for the area remained primarily organized around 
the fur trade, significant numbers of settlers continued to 
pour into the area around the Niagara River and eastern 
Lake Ontario. This flood of settlers so swamped govern~ 
ment officials that, by 1788, Philip Frey, the Crown sur-
veyor in the area, had resigned himself to only laying out 
lots "in such parts of the country where I found people 
were taking up the lands and settling in a promiscuous 
manner."()) 
The Indian Department and military authorities were 
always aware of their limited power and the extent to which 
they must rely upon the good will of the Indian nations for 
the protection of these incoming settlers. The problems 
inherent in this situation became acute after the American 
revolution and the settling of loyalists and disbanded 
soldiers in the Lower Great Lakes area. George Powell, 
secretary to the Province of Quebec, warned military 
authorities in the area that these settlers were "at the 
mercy of the savages whenever these people may take it 
into their heads to quarrel with them ... (4) The tension of 
the situation was heightened given the new settlers' attitude 
towards the Indian nations around them. Most of these 
settlers, although they couldn't agree with the rebellious 
nature of the colonies to the south, had been long incul-
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cated with the superior and antagonistic nature of Indian/ 
white relations in the States. Isaac Weld, after travel-
ling through the Great Lakes area in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, gave this assessment of the situation: 
"The necessity of treating the Indians 
with respect and attention is strongly in-
culcated in the minds of the English settlers, 
and they endeavour to act accordingly; but 
still they cannot banish wholly from their 
minds, as the French do, the idea that the 
Indians are an inferior race to them, to 
which circumstances is to attribute the pre-
dilection of the Indians for the French rather 
than for them." (5) 
By 1791, with the birth of Upper Canada as a 
distinct political entity, it had become obvious to col-
onial officials that not only must "something be done to 
conciliate the affections"( 6) of the Indians around the 
lower Great Lakes, but also that the new colonial govern-
ment had to embark on measures to extend their control over 
the Indian nations within the cor~ines of the colony. Both 
of these objectives were uppermost in the mind of the first 
Lieutenant Governor, John Graves Simcoe. 
Simcoe brought energy and imagination, often 
excessive, to the government of Upper Canada. He sought to 
exemplify the prosperity available through British guidance 
and, through a demonstration of this prosperity, draw the 
rebellious. states to the south back into the folds of the 
65 
Empire. Simcoe's vision of the Upper Canada he wished to 
foster did not allow for large areas reserved for and 
controlled by wandering bands of Indians. 
The first step in Simcoe's plan was the orderly 
settlement of the interior of the colony. In Simcoe's 
words: 
"To settle these various descriptions of 
men so as to promote the cultivation of the 
land, to give power and energy to civilization, 
efficacy to just government, and to combine a 
force whose appearance may prevent the medita-
tion of hostility, it is indispensibly necessary 
that a Capital should be established in some 
central situation and that ... almost instantan-
eously a Great Body of Emigrants should be 
collected in its vicinity.• (7) 
He eventually settled on the Town of York for his 
new capital. The final decision in favour of York was in 
no small way determined by the ease with. which he foresaw 
communication with the interior from the proposed new 
capital. The French fort of Toronto (at York) had for 
many years during the latter part of the French regime been 
the terminus of a secondary fur route which had joined 
Lakes Ontario and Huron through the carrying place from 
Toronto to Lake le Claie, later renamed Simcoe, and from 
there down the Severn River to Matchedash Bay on Lake Huron.(S) 
Simcoe believed by locating his new capital at the site of 
this old French fort he would not only establish effective 
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control of this route but would promote settlement between 
Lake Ontario and Lake Simcoe. 
In this hope he was acting in part upon the assess-
ment of Benjamin Frobisher who reported to General Henry 
Hamilton, shortly before the beginnings of civil authority 
in Upper Canada. Frobisher told Hamilton the lands from 
Lake Ontario to Lake le Claie "abound with good wood and 
are generally fit for cultivation." He warned the military 
authorities though "there are several-villages of Mississ-
auga ... who raise Indian corn and other grain and whose 
friendship it will be necessary to cultivate ... (9) 
Indeed, perhaps uppermost in Simcoe's mind was the 
security he felt would accrue to the new colony if his plan 
of settlement should be adopted. Simcoe believed that 
Matchedash Bay on Lake Huron would prove of vital importance 
to British interests in the event of war with the States. 
In 1794 he wrote with some urgency to Lord Dorchester: 
"The necessity of occupying Matchedash 
Bay and Long Point becomes to me every hour 
More evident, in particular as I know of no 
other Ports in which our shipping would find 
shelter should the Army of the States occupy 
Detroit," (10) 
Given the hostility of the Ojibwa to the British in 
1791, when Simcoe assumed his duties, an important element 
in his planning was the control this proposed settlement 
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would give the British authorities over the Ojibwa and 
Mississauga. Simcoe, writing to the British Colonial Office 
in 1792, assured the officials" 
" ... it is requisite for the safety and 
security of the Province to occupy the diff-
erent Posts I have intimated, York, Long 
Point and London, to separate and command 
the Indian Nations ... 
The extent of this settlement reaching 
to the waters that fall into Lake Huron (Lake 
Simcoe to Matchedash Bay) will form a strong 
barrier should the Messassaque Nation ... be 
hostile to the British interests." (11) 
Simcoe's plan of settlement required an orderly 
transfer of land from the Ojibwa to the Crown and a molli-
fication of the tense relations which had developed between 
the Ojibwa and settlers and British interests. British 
officials had already purchased much of the land required 
for Simcoe's nascent dreams. In 1790 the Mississauga had 
sold much of the land north of Lake Ontario between the Bay 
of Quinte and Lake le Claie and Rice Lake. Despite Indian 
Department official promises, many of the Mississauga were 
disappointed in the extent and tardiness of payments for 
this property, and continued to harbour rankled feelings 
because of the perceived unfairness.( 12 ) 
Indeed throughout most of this period Indian land 
purchases remained in a state of confusion which bewildered 
colonial officials and angered the Indian nations involved. 
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In 1784 Pokq_uanee, a Mississauga chief, replied to Indian 
Department demands that although 
"his nation did not own all the land 
between the three lakes, [they] were willing 
to transfer their 'right of soil' and pro-
perty from the head of Lake Ontario ... to 
the River le Tranche." (13) 
Of course neither colonial officials nor the 
Indians themselves were positive about the meaning of 'right 
of soil' as opposed to ownership. Colonial officials simply 
considered the land to be sold. This type of land trans-
action continued to cause misunderstanding, bitter feelings 
and, more cynically, resulted in the Indians of Upper Canada, 
particularly the Ojibwa, being cheated out of vast tracts 
of land, 
There is no denying the colonial officials were 
intent on getting as much land as they could out of the 
hands of the Ojibwa for as little as possible. In the early 
years of settlement in Upper Canada the military authorities, 
with their accustomed heightened appreciation for the 
power of the Six Nations, were solicitous of their good 
feelings to the exclusion of Ojibwa/Mississauga interests. 
In 1779, Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton, the commander at 
Fort Niagara, resisted attempts by Butler's Rangers to 
settle on Six Nations' land with the warning, "we must be 
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cautious how we encroach on the lands of the Six Nations,"(l4) 
but was agreeable a year later to having them settle on 
Mississauga land. This type of cavalier indifference to 
the feelings of the Ojibwa was again displayed in 1780. 
Guy Johnson and General Haldimand were discussing a further 
purchase of four miles of land on the Niagara River. 
Johnson warned Haldimand that although the land was owned 
by Mississauga "it is in the neighborhood of the Senecas ... 
[thus] it is necessary to make some previous arrangement 
with their chiefs to facilitate the business with the Miss-
issaugas, who I apprehend will make few difficulties."(l5) 
After this purchase Johnson again demonstrated the British 
attitude toward the land purchases with his observation to 
Haldimand that "the Indians are well satisfied, having 
received about the value of JOO suits of clothing which was 
as little as I could give them and they would have got the 
most part of that q_uantity in a little time without any 
consideration from their necessitous condition."(l 6) 
Much of the confusion concerning land surrenders in 
Upper Canada resulted from both Indian Department and Indian 
uncertainty over the extent of lands under their control. 
Officials were continually negotiating with Ojibwa along 
the lakes for land which extended well back of the lake 
frontage. Of course 'lake' Indians would feel no compunc-
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tion over selling their 'right of property' to land which 
they used only occasionally. Whether British officials 
conducted these fraudulent negotiations knowingly or not 
it resulted in almost constant confusion. Government 
surveyors were often being confronted by Ojibwa bands who 
had no inkling their land had indeed been sold.(l7) 
Gradually the Ojibwa began to realize the true value 
of the property they were transferring. The Six Nations had 
their own bitter experiences with the loss of their land in 
colonial New York. As early as 1768 a Seneca chief, 
Warraghiyagey, had complained to Johnson: 
"Wherever we turned we saw our blood, 
and when our young men went to go a hunting 
the wild beasts in our country they found 
it covered with fences and that they were 
weary crossing them; neither can they get 
venison to eat, or bark to make huts for 
the beasts are run away and the trees cut 
down." (18) 
The Six Nations kept close to their hearts the memory of 
that experience and were much more careful about the posses-
sion of their new lands in Upper Canada. Under the 
prompting of Joseph Brant, the Mohawk Chief, the Ojibwa 
began to listen to his advice on most land sales. This 
new association, coupled with the growing threat of up-
rising by the 'back' Indians prompted the colonial officials 
to approve a purchase of land in 1797 for three shillings 
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four pence an acre, as compared to the previous government 
price of two pence per acre.(i9) 
The colonial government reacted to this solidarity 
among the Indian nations of Upper Canada in a characteristic 
and decisive fashion. Peter Russell almost immediately 
instructed his agents "to do everything in their power ... 
to foment any existing jealousy between the Chippewas and 
the Six Nations and to prevent as far as possible any junction 
or good understanding between these two tribes."(ZO) The 
Department began to give the Mississauga their annual 
presents at the River Credit or Humber rather than at Six 
Nations and refused to recognize Brant as their agent. 
By 1805, due to government intrigue and Brant's 
overbearing attitude, the close bond between the Mississauga 
and the Six Nations had been broken. Almost a decade of 
disease epidemics among the Ojibwa had seriously reduced 
both their numbers and their power and they again lost all 
control over the number and extent of land surrenders. Most 
Ojibwa land to the tip of Georgian Bay was considered by the 
British to have been transferred to their dominion. 
Whether the Ojibwa surrenders came at a period of 
disorganization or in the brief period of effective bargain~ 
ing, the purchases were, of course, not fair transactions. 
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The British believed themselves to be purchasing all rights 
of usage and property, in short, ownership, whereas Ojibwa 
attitude to their land and land surrenders was probably 
best described by Chief Yellowhead, a chief of Lake Simcoe 
Ojibwa, at an Indian Council near Holland River in 1818. 
He told Deputy Superintendent W, Claus that "it would be 
folly in me to say that the land is mine, for the land 
belongs to God, who bestowed it on all for our subsistence ... (2i) 
Expectedly, the surrender of their land and the 
growth of settlements in Upper Canada had a disastrous 
effect on Ojibwa prosperity. In the early days of settle-
ment the few nascent co~Jnunities provided a ready market 
for the produce of the Indian hunt. Weld, in his travels, 
observed that "the Mississauga keep the inhabitants of 
Kingston and Niagara and of the different towns on the lake 
well supplied with fish and game, .. ( 22 ) which provided a 
welcome supplement to trapping income. Indeed game was so 
plentiful and the hunt so attractive that Simcoe even felt 
it necessary to restrict the ownership of firearms among 
settlers in the Niagara district to ensure that they didn't 
neglect their farms.( 23) 
But hunting could not for long remain a viable 
pastime for the Ojibwa in Upper Canada. As settlement 
continued apace they soon became more and more restricted 
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in their hunting grounds. Payment for what hunting they 
did pursue was as often measured in barrels of rum as in 
any practical goods. Whole bands periodically engaged in 
prolonged fits of drunken revelry which, coupled with 
restricted hunting lands, prompted a number of the southern 
Ojibwa continually to neglect the chase and rely more 
completely on presents and payments from British officials. 
As this became more and more the norm among the Southern 
Ojibwa they received this admonition from Shawaraxcapowee, 
an Ojibwa chief from the northern lake areas: "In a little 
time you will not know how to hunt and the English will 
despise you ... ( 25) Although Shawaraxcapowee's prophecy 
proved unerring the Ojibwa of Upper Canada had little 
choice. 
In the negotiations for land sales, the Ojibwa were 
assured that the incoming settlers would be of assistance 
to the Indian, By 1805 it was painfully obvious that this 
promise could not be kept. The settler was triumphing over 
the hunter. The two could not mix. The Mississauga Chief, 
Quinipeo, complained to W. Claus: 
"when we encamp on the land they drive 
us off and shoot our dogs and never give us 
any assistance as was promised ... Father, the 
farmers call us dogs and threaten to shoot 
us in the same manner when we go on their 
land ... " (26) 
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As the proceeds of the Ojibwa hunt continued to 
decline so did the amount of fur they were able to supply 
the traders in the Southern Great Lakes area. As the 
total of furs declined and the number of settlers continued 
to increase the fur trade lost much of its importance in 
the estimation of the officials in Upper Canada. By 1792, 
Simcoe in a series of proposals to the colonial office 
stated that on its present footing the fur trade was "of 
no use whatever"( 27), instead he believed it was a serious 
deterrent to the continued growth of Upper Canada. 
By 1820 it was obvious to many Ojibwa that they 
could no longer rely on the traditional methods of subsis-
tence. Their hunting lands were steadily shrinking, cut 
up by farm fences and reduced in abundance by cleared land. 
Neither could they hope to trap enough to provide for their 
wants. The land could no longer support it. All the while 
more white settlers continued to stream into what was to 
the Ojibwa still their land. In 1820 a Mississauga chief 
summed up the situation to William Graves: 
"You came as a wind blown across the 
great lake. The wind wafted you, we nursed 
you. We protected you till you became a 
mighty tree that spread through our hunting 
land, with its branches you now lash us." (28) 
CHAPTER 7 
MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE AMONG THE INDIANS OF 
THE LOWER GREAT LAKES AREA - 1815-1830 
As already mentioned the primary contact between 
the Ojibwa and the European during the half-century after 
the British conQuest was through traders, both licensed 
and unlicensed, who ventured among the Ojibwa bands. Part 
of the reason the field was left so completely open to 
these traders was the notable lack of attempts to prosy-
letize among the Ojibwa. Previously the Ojibwa, secure in 
their world and adapting well to the changes which engulfed 
them in the fur trade, had almost totally rejected the 
efforts of Jesuits and Recollit priests under the French 
regime. Small pockets, segments of some Ojibwa bands, had 
been baptized and fewer, even smaller pockets, followed any 
of the precepts of Catholic teaching.(!) 
After the conQuest even this dwindling missionary 
exertion declined. British attitude towards the Indian in 
Upper Canada, as described earlier, was governed by few 
considerations: maintaining their allegiance in war, pre-
venting attacks on settlers and their active participation 
in the fur trade. Neither military authorities nor indivi-
dual traders were thus likely to see any advantage in the 
vesting of missionary zeal upon the Ojibwa. 
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Even if the British official attitude had been more 
inclined to Ojibwa conversion it is doubtful that England 
could have supplied the missionary enterprise req_uired. 
England throughout the eighteenth century was committed 
to mercantile expansion and almost alone among European 
nations had not yet tied this expansion to converts to the 
Church of England. Indeed, as late as 1793 Lord McCartney 
could proudly proclaim at the Imperial Court of China that 
"the English ... have no priests or chaplains with them as 
have other European nations",(Z) as his ultimate argument 
in favour of British traders. 
This attitude was destined for a wholesale, if not 
abrupt, change, By the late eighteenth century-early nine-
teenth century British attitudes towards much of che world 
around them were experiencing pervasive changes. Still very 
much convinced of the benefits of British industry and 
secure in the right of the British mercantile interests to 
control the globe, they were becoming, haltingly but 
inextricably, concerned with its effect upon the other 
'inferior' peoples of the world. Led in many of these 
changes, through parliament and pamphleteering, by the 
Clapham Sect, English society was becoming as concerned with 
spreading the benefits of British society, justice, letters 
and ultimately religion as it had been and still was with 
the spread of British industry.(J) 
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Although, as already indicated, much of this quite 
amazing shift was championed by the Clapham Sect of par-
liamentarians and men of letters, in the sphere of Indian 
missions in North America the more important genesis came 
rather indirectly in the form of John Wesley and, more 
directly, the Methodist faith. 
Wesley had been a not too successful Church of 
England minister. Much of his lack of success sprang from 
too little commitment to the idea of salvation as expounded 
by the Church of England. Wesley, in true Methodist fashion, 
suffered under this lack of Commitment until he "felt the 
divine spark kindled in his soul"( 4) and dedicated his life 
to helping others to a realization of this salvation. To 
Wesley those intent on searching for holiness must: 
"Let thy religion be the religion of 
the heart. Let it lie deep in thy utmost 
soul ... Be serious. Let the whole stream 
of thy thoughts, words and actions flow 
from the deepest conviction that thou 
standest on the edge of the great gulf,,, 
just ready to drop in, either into ever-( 5) lasting glory or everlasting burning ... " 
Wesley and Methodism, with its powerful fire and 
brimstone concept of salvation and relatively exultant 
public prayers, enjoyed a moderate success among the middle 
and lower classes of British society. By 1769 it had 
enough of a following in Britain and among new emigrants 
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to the colonies to support two missionaries in America. 
From the initial work of Richard Boardman and Joseph Pilmoor, 
Methodism in America enjoyed immediate success. Wesley's 
concept of salvation, the inherent egalitarianism of Method-
ist doctrine and the increasingly exuberant exhortations of 
Methodist preachers tapped a previously unbroached vein in 
pioneer America. 
Methodism in America, though, quickly became quite 
distinct from its British or Wesleyan Methodist root. To 
Wesley, Methodism was always to remain essentially part of 
the Church of England. This connection, perceived by most 
British Methodists, was always able to temper the more 
profuse exertions of both exhorters and saved alike, which 
soon typified Methodist meetings in the colony. Thus by 
1784, after American independence, the British connection 
was no longer felt to be a desirable attribute for what in 
essence had become an uniquely American church. That year 
the Reverend Thomas Coke presided over the establishment 
of the Methodist Episcopal Church of America thus severing 
the fetters long held by the Wesleyan Methodists. 
Methodism was fundamentally a missionary faith. 
The strong belief in the salvation of the individual, the 
commitment that true conversion required of the saved and 
the enthusiasm and vitality that these brought to the Method-
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ist church constantly required new arenaSfor the doctrine 
to be propagated. Consequently, through that "great 
agency for the rescue of lost souls," the camp meeting, 
American Methodists extended their circuit into Upper 
Canada. ( 6) 
It was one thing, though, to spread the gospel 
among pioneer backwoodsmen - rude, unlettered to be sure, 
but the vast majority from British stock - and quite 
another to attempt to convert the 'wild heathen' in their 
wilderness haunts. Most settlers in Upper Canada and many 
ministers of the different faiths would have thought, at 
the turn of the century, such a proposition slightly ludi-
crous. Until the second decade of the century the attempts 
were few and uninspired. 
In 1801 the Moravian Brother, Denke, encouraged by 
the visits of some Ojibwa to the Fairfield community, 
attempted to start a mission at the St. Clair River. Al-
though his endeavours were accepted by some of the Ojibwa 
there, and at least tolerated by the majority, his advances 
were not particularly encouraging. Finally, during one of 
his absences, white traders nearby were able to convince a 
number of the Ojibwa .that recent sickness was his responsi-
bility, and he was forced to abandon the mission.(?) Roman 
Catholic priests occasionally visited bands such as the 
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Ojibwa on Drummond Island, reconfirmed them in their faith 
and appointed lay preachers, but did little to effect any 
external change in their situation. By the early 1800's 
the Mohawk at the Six Nations Reserve on the Grand River 
were occasionally being visited by a Church of England 
minister and had service read to those that assembled on 
Sunday by one of their chiefs, usually Henry Aron Hill. 
Their oratory most often lacked ardour and, in the admit-
tedly biased opinion of Peter Jones: 
",,,the gospel preached among them 
seemed to have little or no effect upon 
their moral conduct .•. Drunkenness, quar-
relling, fighting, were the prevailing 
vices of the Six Nations of Indians .... 
in this respect they were no better than 
their pagan brethren,"(8) 
The overall attitude of the Church of England was 
probably best described in the purported confession of 
Rev. A. Pridle to Peter Jones when he declared that 11 he 
and his fellow labourers laughed at the idea as ... a 
fruitless effort ... (9) 
The first Methodist ministers fared little better, 
if demonstrating a little more concern. Individual minis-
ters would sometimes hold camp meetings which were also 
open to Indians and such zealots as ':iathan Bangs were 
preaching to groups of Indians in Upper Canada as early as 
1803(.!0) But, despite the presence of seventy-six Methodist 
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ministers(ll) in Upper Canada by 1812, the Methodist Church 
did not officially interest itself in the conversion of 
the Indian until after 1815, 
The spark which finally prompted Methodist interest 
was the work of an unsanctified coloured preacher, John 
Steward. Steward, without instruction from the Methodist 
conference, had established a mission among the Wyandots 
near Detroit. Their immediate response to his fiery ex-
hortations opened the eyes of such Me-thodist leaders as 
W, Case and provided the impulse for further energy to be 
put into the conversion of the Indians of North America, 
particularly those in Upper Canada. The successful work 
of John Seward came as a revelation to some. In the words 
of Alvin Torry: 
''No one it seems since the days of 
Barnhard to the time of the reformation 
among the Wyandots, thought that the gospel 
of Christ could march directly up to the 
wild, drunken, degraded Indian's heart and 
make a successful attack upon the evil of 
his moral nature."(12) 
The Methodists launched their attack almost immediately. 
The Rev. Alvin Torry was assigned to the Six Nations 
Reserve on the Bay of Quinte and in the spring of 1824 
the first Methodist Indian Church was established at Davis-
ville.(13) 
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Despite this advance, the hard work of the Method-
ist preachers and the inherent attractiveness of Methodist 
doctrine, Methodist accomplishments remained unspectacular 
until, in 1825, Peter Jones attended a Methodist Camp 
Meeting at the Six Nations, held by Alvin Torry and William 
Case. Jones, the son of a Mississauga mother and a Welsh 
father, had been waver.hg towards an acceptance of 
Christian doctrine for some time. In his own words -
"I had been halting between two opinions. 
Sometimes whilst reading the word of God, or 
hearing it promoted, I would be almost per-
suaded to become a Christian, but when I 
looked at the conduct of the whites who were 
called Christians I saw them drunk, q_uarrel-
ling, fighting, cheating the poor Indians 
and acting as if there was no God, I was led 
to think there could be no truth in the white 
man's religion and felt inclined to fall 
back again to my old superstitions," (14) 
Jones' conversion is most often presented in 
typical Methodist 'divine spark' fashion. Alvin Torry 
says, 
"As he listened the word of truth sank 
deep in his heart and conviction seized upon 
his soul. The tears streamed from his eyes ... 
he leaned forward and cried aloud for mercy."(15) 
Whether his conversion was quite that dramatic, his 
'salvation' and committal to the Methodist cause contained 
serious portent for Methodist missions in Upper Canada. 
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From this point, until almost the end of the 
18JO's, the Methodists were successful in gathering con-
verts to their missions and in effecting at least external 
changes in their mode of life in a way which is unprece-
dented in missionary endeavour. The success was based 
upon two corner stones, the work of Peter Jones or native 
assistants like him and the advantages to be gained from 
education of the young and industry expended in agricul-
tural pursuits. 
Jones, shortly after his conversion, was able to 
convince a large segment of his mother's band of Mississ-
auga to journey to the Grand River and listen to the 
Methodist ministers. They arrived in tatters, having spent 
much of their travelling time around "huckster shops"(l 6) 
between the Credit and Grand Valleys. Jones and the 
Methodists were able to convince a majority of the tribe to 
throw off their previous wandering ways, abstain from the 
use of spirits, and devote themselves to industrial pursuit 
of the orderly life. 
It is from this initial success that Methodist 
missions grew. Both Lt. Governor Maitland and Bishop 
Strachan(i7) were sufficiently impressed with the orderly 
conduct of the Methodist converts at the 1825 distribution 
of presents and swayed enough by Peter Jones' petitions to 
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help the Methodists establish a mission on the Credit River. 
Accordingly houses were built, money spent on agricultural 
implements and a school house erected. The first, and 
probably the most successful, Methodist mission in Upper 
Canada was established, 
The Methodists used their success well. Through 
Peter Jones they were able to recruit a number of Ojibwa 
convinced of the benefits of Methodist teaching who travel-
led with Methodist preachers to extol the virtue of sal-
vation. Now, thanks to the Credit Mission, the advantages 
of salvation would be obvious to all who wanted to see: 
log houses, instruction in agriculture and schooling for 
their children, Word spread, the great experiment the 
Ojibwa at the Credit River were undertaking was known 
throughout the Great Lakes area, and portions of many bands 
came down to see for themselves. The Methodists used these 
visits to great advantage. George Ryerson, for some time 
the Methodist minister at the Credit, describes the 
general formula used: 
"The uniform practice of' the Christians 
on such occasions is to divide the visitors 
between one, two or three families, according 
to their numbers, where they are hospitably 
entertained for the two or three weeks that 
they generally stay, The other Christian 
inhabitants of the village then send each his 
portion of corn, or potatoes, or venison, etc,, 
to the houses where the strangers were enter-
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tained. During the temporary residence so 
indefatigable are the Christians in exhort-
ing them that they seldom return to the 
solitudes of the wilderness without more 
or less having experienced the salvation of 
God through faith in Jesus Christ," (18) 
With the good example of the Credit, with converts 
returning to diverse, scattered bands of Ojibwa, no doubt 
with thoughts of full stomachs and warm cabins as fixed 
in their heads as Methodist exhortations on salvation, 
and with Methodist ministers accompanied by fervent native 
assistants spreading the word to Ojibwa bands across Upper 
Canada, Methodist Indian missions began to spring up 
throughout the colony. 
Methodist exertion and the conversion of Peter 
Jones do not, however, explain ade~uately why significant 
portions of the Ojibwa now appeared to be ready to accept 
Christian teaching after sosoundlyrejecting attempts in 
the previous century. 
Much had changed for the Ojibwa between 1760 and 
the early 1800's. In the words of the British Commissioners 
investigating Indian affairs in Upper Canada: 
" , , , They were an untaught, unwary race 
among a population ready to take every ad-
vantage of them. Their lands, their presents 
and annuities, the produce of the chase, their 
guns and clothing, whatever they possessed of 
value, were objects of temptation to needy 
settlers and the unprincipled trader, to whom 
their ignorance of commerce and of the 
English language and their remarkable 
fondness for spirits yielded them an easy 
prey."(19) 
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They were not, though, blind. The wisest among them 
saw early that many of their previous assumptions no 
longer pertained to a world so radically altered. Through-
out the early part of the nineteenth century individual 
Ojibwa chiefs petitioned the government for assistance in 
learning new ways of coping, These suggestions were 
invariably ignored. The 1805 Purchase of Land from the 
Ojibwa had, according to the Ojibwa chief David Sawyer, 
included the promise by the government to settle them in a 
village, provide agricultural implements and, most impor-
tantly, teachers. The implements were supplied but no 
instructions as to their use. The tools waited, rusting 
in the village clearings.(ZO) 
As conditions throughout the early 1800's deterior-
ated - as settlers grew in number and hunting less viable -
more and more Ojibwa began to realize the need for change 
and became. increasingly frustrated in their inability to 
effect that change. Given these altered circumstances it 
is not surprising that the Methodists, with their demon-
strated effectiveness in helping accomplish that transition, 
should gain immediate support. The Ojibwa were not 
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primarily drawn to the Methodist version 0£ salvation, 
rather they accepted the Methodist missionaries as the 
only brokers available to help individual bands begin to 
carve a li£e £or themselves in the new society growing up 
around them. 
CHAPTER 8 
CHANGING GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES IN THE 183D'S 
In May of 1829 Sir J, Kempt proposed to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies some general principles 
on which to base a revision of Indian affairs in Upper and 
Lower Canada. He suggested in part that the Indian Depart-
ment: 
''1st. Collect the Indians in consid-
erable numbers and settle them in villages 
with a due portion of land for their 
cultivation and support. 
2nd. To make such provision for their 
religious improvement, education and instruc-
tion in husbandry as circumstances may from· 
time to time require. 
Jrd. To afford them such assistance in 
building their houses, rations and in pro-
curing such seed and agricultural implements 
as may be necessary, commuting when practicable 
a portion of their presents for the latter."(1) 
These three suggestions were accepted by the Lords 
of the Treasury, although funds to be spent on it were 
severely restricted (twenty thousand pounds annually - the 
total expense of presents for the pr-evious year).( 2 ) Con-
sequently in 1830, the control of Indian Affairs in Upper 
Canada passed from the hands of the military authorities 
directly into those of the Lieutenant Governor Sir John 
Colborne. This shift was both the cu+mination of a two 
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decade period of transition, the beginning of a new 
aspect in government relations with the Indian and a time 
of dramatic portent for the Ojibwa in Upper Canada. What 
it meant simply was, in the words of Duncan Campbell Scott, 
that 
",,,Indian officers were no longer to 
be solely purveyors of presents or almoners 
of the crown grants; they were to be trans-
formed into the executants of a humane and 
progressive plan for the civilization of 
the aborigines."(3) 
This transformation, as important as it was, has 
been cited often in discussions of Indian Affairs in Upper 
Canada, most notably by Robert Surtees in "The Development 
of Indian Reserve Policy in Upper Canada." The focus of 
these discussions has been, though, on humanitarian 
impulses emanating from Whitehall, an integral part of 
that transmutation in British thought discussed earlier. 
This is a neither complete nor accurate picture of the 
process. As suggested earlier, Kempt's suggestions, their 
acceptance by the Lords of Treasury, and the subsequent 
shifting of authority for Indian Affairs was the culmina-
tion of a lengthy process, the result of over a decade of 
suggestion by lac.al authorities, pressure from Ojibwa 
desiring change and, ultimately, an immediate reaction to 
changing circumstances and a perceived threat to continued 
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Indian Department influence over the Indians under its 
jurisdiction. All these forces continued to batter away 
at military authority, inertia and jealousy. 
In the decade before Kempt's suggestions most 
perceptive observers saw that the conduct of Indian affairs 
was doing little good for Ojibwa in Upper Canada, and a few 
cared enough to note this fact. In 1818 Deputy Superinten-
dent William Claus remarked to the Mississauga after 
purchasing their final tract of land: 
''Your great father's wish is to make you 
comfortable but I much fear you will not 
benefit by it. I see a number of Boats about 
your River and white people in them. They 
are here for no other purpose but to make (I+) 
you drunk and get your clothing from you." 
Despite inadequate government attempts to restrict 
whisky traders at the presentation of annuities, their 
attendance "rendered the scene •.. one of riot and debauchery 
as long as anything was left wherewith spirits could be 
procured." ( 5) 
As early as June of 1.820 Lieutenant Governor 
Maitland had suggested to the Earl of Bathurst that they 
appoint a clergyman, a school master and teacher-farmer for 
the Ojibwa. ( 6) Despite these observations and suggestions 
little change appeared in the Indian Department. Ultimate 
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authority continued to be vested in the military. They 
perceived their responsibility, as far as the Indian was 
concerned, solely in terms of maintaining their allegiance 
in case of war, and protecting settlers against any 
potential threats from Indian bands. The military author-
ities believed, and rightly so, that their system of 
presents and payments of annuities would ensure their 
British connection. As late as 1829 Sir J, Kempt was able 
to assure Sir John Colborne that "there is little doubt 
that by a continuence of kindness they will be disposed 
again to take up the Tomahawk when required by King George."(?) 
Probably more important in maintaining this concep-
tion of the relationship between Indian Department and 
their charges, was that until the mid-1820's the Depart-
ment was controlled by loyalists imbued with the William 
Johnson tradition in Indian negotiations. These loyalists, 
the later-Johnsons, John Butler, Alexander McKee, Matthew 
Elliot, had long been used to viewing the Indians as allies 
in war, leaving them to govern their own affairs when not 
needed in this capacity. They did not begin to become 
replaced by the new breed of superintendent, G. Ironsides 
and T.G. Anderson, until well after the war of 1812. ( 3 ) 
Finally, as an important sphere of military opera-
tion in the colony, the Indian Department had become a 
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significant source of patronage for the Commander of the 
Forces and those immediately below him, one jealously 
guarded. ( 9) 
By the late 1820's a number of new circumstances 
had combined to ensure that a continuation of military 
authority over the Indian Department carried along the 
same lines was no longer tenable. The cost of the annual 
presents distributed by the Indian Department had climbed 
considerably since their inception in the last century. 
As the cost grew and the perceived importance of the 
Indian, particularly the Ojibwa, as allies for war decreased, 
the Lords of Treasury began to search for ways of reducing 
or eliminating this charge. 
As early as 1822, Lord Bathurst h8 .. d written to 
Lord Dalhousie reg_uesting his advice concerning the reduc-
tion of the expense. Lord Dalhousie's reply was not 
encouraging: 
"Old customs have established claims in 
the minds of the Indians, upon the bounty of 
their Great Father ... which if curtailed or 
broken off, would be considered a breach of 
faith, unjustifiable in their eyes, and would 
assuredly be followed by conseg_uences serious 
to be avoided."(10) 
Even into the 18JO's the g_uestion of the expense 
of annual presents plagued the Treasury Department and 
93 
Secretary of State for the colonies. In 1832, in reply 
to a query by Lord.Goderich, Sir John Colborne informed 
him that he believed that "the British Government cannot, 
I imagine, now, under any circumstances, get rid of an 
inconvenient debt. ,.(ll) 
Assured that the continued issuance of presents was 
a necessity Treasury searched for means of reducing their 
cost. In 1827 Lord Goderich wished to commute the presents 
into money payments to reduce the costs of transport and 
the employees required by the Indian Department. Again 
they were thwarted, The Earl of Dalhousie responded that 
"the payment of presents or other tribute to them in money 
would be received with the utmost alarm •.. money to the 
Indians is instantly spent on spirituous liquor ... ( 12 ) 
Given the state of Indian affairs in Upper Canada, 
the continued and growing cost of the annual presents seemed 
a certainty for many years to come. The ability of Kempt's 
proposals to relieve the Imperial purse eventually of a 
cost quickly being seen as intolerable was one of its most 
persuasive arguments. In 1829 Sir James Kempt communicated 
to Secretary of State Sir G. Murray, the judgment that 
"the settling of the Indians ... will gradually relieve His 
Majesty's Government from the expense of these presents 
and eventually from that of the Indian Department,"(l3) 
There were other important recommendations for the 
change. The Indian Department was being pressed by a 
number of local superintendents and agents, as well as 
concerned observers, to establish the Indian Department 
on a new footing. 
In 1824 James Buchanan sent "A Plan for the 
Melioration and Civilization of the British North American 
Indians" to the Earl of Dalhousie, the Governor General 
of the Canadas. In this plan he called for the creation 
of a "Royal Asylum" for the Indians within the line of 
44th degree north latitude and Lakes Huron and Simcoe, 
where they should be protected and instructed. Although 
the Earl of Dalhousie did not act upon these recommendations 
he was not able to ignore the implications.< 14) 
Perhaps the most important of these promptings 
came from the superintendent of the Indian station at 
Drummond Island, T.G. Anderson. Anderson is an interesting 
character central to our story (because he became Superin-
tendent at Coldwater-Narrows) and played a pivotal, if 
little recognized, role in Indian affairs in Upper Canada 
throughout much of the first half of the nineteenth century. 
A glimpse into Anderson's early career is justified as it 
is typical of many employees of the Indian Department 
during this period. 
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Anderson arrived in Canada, at Kingston, in 1795 
intent on developing a career in law. After working for a 
merchant briefly he was seduced by the merchant's brother, 
Robert Dickson, to join him as an Indian trader in the 
Wisconsin area. Dickson, according to Horseman, "the most 
prominent British fur trader on the Upper Mississippi"(i5) 
and Anderson enjoyed a profitable trade until the outbreak 
of the war of 1812, upon which they used their considerable 
influence to encourage their Indian clients to the British 
side, Between the two of them they mustered close to three 
hundred warriors. Anderson and a party of Indians eventually 
took Prairie du Chien in 1814. As a reward, Anderson, in 
1816, was given the post of Clerk for the Indian Department 
at Drummond Island under John Askin Jr,< 16 ) 
In 1817 Anderson, now Superintendent at Drummond 
Island, thought he saw a basic flaw in the handling of the 
Indian Department. He believed that allowing the Indian to 
depend upon Government provisions not only resulted in 
increased costs to the Department, but led to the ultimate 
degeneration of the Indian. He wrote Deputy Superintendent 
W. Claus agrily that 
"They did not raise crops for their own 
winter's subsistence, they whiled away their 
summers slothfully, drinking, and in winter 
when neither fish nor hare are to be caught 
they depend on government provisions," ( 17) 
He went on to propose that the Potaganasee* on Drummond 
Island be denied presents unless they prepare gardens and 
raise crops, that these crops would come under Indian 
Department control and that farmers be hired to instruct 
adult Indians on agriculture and school teachers to wean 
the children from the hunting life, 
Although Anderson did not receive official support 
from the Indian Department for his recommendations, he did 
eventually compel a number of Potaganasee to start gardens 
and his recommendations were probably instrumental in his 
being named Superintendent of the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve. 
The Indian Department was receiving more signifi-
cant pressure from Ojibwa chiefs. In the 1820's the American 
government had spent considerable money and energy in 
erecting establishments, consisting of missionaries, school 
masters, farmers and mechanics. The bulk of these estab-
lishments were grouped around Lake Michigan and Lake 
Superior and seemed to the British authorities to have as 
their purpose the alienation of the affections of the 
* The Potaganasee were in reality Ojibwa. Potaganasee is 
Ojibwa for "many inlets", a term they used to describe their 
home on the north shore of Drummond Island, Anderson and 
the Indian Department simply became used to coining this 
band of Ojibwa as such, a coinage continued here for the 
sake of clarity. 
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'wandering'Indians from the Michigan/Wisconsin area. 
These were the same Indians that the British had spent 
considerable sums on in the form of presents to ensure 
their loyalty. Their allegiance was still felt to be of 
importance.(iB) It seemed that not only were 'wandering' 
Indians being seduced by these developments, but the 
establishments were straining relations between the British 
government and 'resident' Indians as well. 
A speech made by a Potaganasee, Ashagashe, to T.G. 
Anderson at Drummond Island in 1827 is worth quoting at 
length as it gives voice to a fear the Indian Department 
officials held close: 
"Father we have observed with some degree 
of jealousy the establishment of a place at 
Michilmackinac at which the children of our 
great father are taught the means of living 
in the same way the whites do, where they also 
learn to make their thoughts on paper and to 
think the news from books as you do; .... 
. .. Father we might send our children to Mackinac 
to get sense but we are not big knives ... we have 
arms as well as the whites but we don't know 
how to use them," (19) 
Perhaps the most pressing and immediate prompting 
for the civilization policy of the Indian Department was a 
variation on the same fear of American alienation of the 
Indians around the Great Lakes area. As previously dis-
cussed, the Methodist missions were extremely successful 
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and individual Methodist ministers had developed significant 
influence among a number of Ojibwa bands. Not only had the 
success of such missions as the Credit done much to con-
vince authorities that a program to create industrious 
farmers out of the Ojibwa in Upper Canada could be success-
ful, but the success had caused apprehensions about the 
effects of this growing Methodist influence. 
The British believed they had good reason to fear 
Methodist influence. As already seen, the American 
Methodist Episcopal Church bore little resemblance to its 
British source and had cut off all important ties with the 
Wesleyan Methodists. The Methodist missions in Canada were 
controlled until 1828,when the first Canadian conference 
met, by an American based conference of Methodists. More 
importantly, until well after the war of 1812 the vast 
(20) 
majority of Methodist ministers originated in the States. 
[After the war of 1812 the Genesee Conference became much 
more circumspect in finding Upper Canadian or newly arrived 
ministers from the United Kingdom for service in Upper 
Canada.] At a time when American paranoia was running high 
and eight out of ten settlers were of American origin 
Methodjst activity was viewed with extreme suspicious.( 21 ) 
(After all, the British had just been at war with the 
Americans.) 
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If Methodist exhortation among the settlers was 
disliked it is not surprising, given the perceived impor-· 
tance of the Ojibwa as allies in war, that their work 
among the Indians was viewed with increasing dismay. H.G. 
Darling, in 1828, reported to Sir G. Murray that although 
"it is undoubted that they have done some 
good by influencing the Indians to embrace 
Christianity and have inculcated the first 
principles of civilization ... '' 
he wondered 
"whether this disposition of the Indians 
should not be encouraged by the British Govern-
ment, as the most certain means of rivetting 
their affection and securing their loyalty and 
attachment; which wD.l naturally incline to 
that power from where they are sensible their 
chief good is desired,'' (22) 
The Governor General, Sir James Kempt, was even 
more pointed in his fears of the Methodists. He penned a 
warning to Lieutenant Governor Sir J, Colborne that the 
"Methodists inculcate Republican principles in the Indians ... 
if the British Government does not step in between the 
Indians and the Methodist missionaries it may be repented 
too late ... ( 23) 
Thus the change in the focus of the Indian Department 
\ 
and its transfer to Civil Authority; Prompted by employees, 
knowledgeable observers and the Ojibwa themselves, hounded 
by the Treasury Department to reduce costs, afraid of 
100 
American Government influence through their attempts at 
mission stations, anxious about and prompted by Methodist 
successes and, yes, imbued with a real desire to amelior-
ate the degenerating conditions of the Ojibwa in Upper 
Canada, the Indian Department was, at last, ready to 
embark on their experiment in 'civilizing' the Ojibwa, 
the Coldwater-Narrows establishment. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 
In 1829 the British abandoned Drummond Island to 
the Americans. Although the military establishment there 
was ordered to repair to St. Joseph's Island and then Pene-
tanguishene the Indian Department, under Superintendent 
T.G. Anderson, was advised to proceed to Matchedash Bay 
to prepare for the establishment of an agricultural enclave 
there. This enclave, the Coldwater-Narrows Settlement, 
was to run the fourteen miles from the Narrows of Lake 
Simcoe to Matchedash Bay, and was to be based around the 
establishment of individual family :farms along ,, strategic 
road between the two sites.(l) This establishment Colborne 
believed to be the key to Indian Department civilization 
policy. Not only would three tribes of Ojibwa from Lakes 
Simcoe and Huron, as well as the Potaganasee from Drummond 
Island be situated there, but the establishment was meant 
to act as a magnet for the more northerly tribes of Ojibwa. 
They were now to repair to the vicinity (Penetanguishene) 
for their annuities and presents and would be impressed 
enough with the advantages of agricultural life to join 
the Ojibwa already located. Through the connection pro-
vided in their settling into the establishment Colborne 
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believed that the continued allegiance of the northern 
tribes would be ensured while eventually reducing the need 
for continued expenditure on their subsistence.(Z) For 
Coldwater-Narrows to act as this magnet it needed first to 
be successful in settling the Indian tribes of Lake Simcoe 
and Huron. 
At its inception it enjoyed every prospect of 
success. The Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa had for a 
half a century been located in and amongst a number of 
islands in both lakes. Here they had pursued a diversified 
economy, doing some hunting and fishing, but also planting 
a significant amount of corn, turnips and squash. As in 
the rest of Upper Canada the latter years of the eighteenth 
century showed a marked decline in the viability of tradi-
tional economic pursuits. This coupled with a general 
demoralizing of' the various bands removed much of' the 
impulse for any greater exertion in maintaining their way 
of' lif'e. 
Perhaps the most complete picture of' the lives of' 
these Ojibwa near the turn of' the century was that drawn 
by Alex MacDonnell, Sheriff of the Home District, in his 
diary of a journey by Lieutenant Governor John Graves 
Simcoe from Humber Bay to Matchedash Bay in 1793,<3) During 
their brief visit to the area Mc:·Donnell recorded that the 
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Lake Simcoe Indians had given up raising crops on a number 
of the islands, including Grape Island. Throughout the 
whole duration of their visit the Ojibwa the Governor's 
party came across were continually drunk. Indeed, on the 
·1ast day of their stay at Matchedash Bay all the Indians 
had continued to drink through the night and at the time 
of the Lieutenant Governor's departure they "had not the 
use of limb or reason"( 4) forcing Simcoe himself to man a 
paddle. 
The Ojibwa got most of their rum from a number of 
traders operating on Lakes Huron and Simcoe. The most 
important of these was Jean Baptiste Constance, who had 
been trading at Matchedash for well over fifteen years. 
Although by all accounts Constance was one of the most 
scrupulous of traders in Upper Canada, an indication of 
the type of relations he enjoyed with the Ojibwa can be 
garnered from MacDonnell's description of his trading post. 
It was a solid stockade, extremely well defended. Although 
occasionally he would allow small parties of Ojibwa 
inside the stockade, the bulk of the trading was done 
outside of the garrison and the Indians were never allowed 
to drink inside its walls. Both the Lake Simcoe and Lake 
Huron Ojibwa had developed a dependency relation on 
Constance and a number of other, less scrupulous, traders, 
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sinking so far in debt there was little hope of ever 
extricating themselves from it. 
Simcoe's journey corresponded to one of the periodic 
epidemics which occasionally swept the 'back' Ojibwa. Both 
at Lake Simcoe and at Lake Huron Simcoe found many Indians 
sick and a number dying. At De Grassi Point an Ojibwa 
principal man predicted that "the end of the world is at 
hand, Indians will be no more" and petitioned Simcoe's 
party "you white men pray: we poor Indians do not know 
what it is, but we hope you will entreat the Great Spirit 
to remove the sickness from amongst us ... (5) 
In recent years these Ojibwa had demonstrated an 
inclination to settle into the type of orderly life 
envisioned by Colborne and Anderson. As ear·ly as 1827 
Yellowhead, principal chief of the largest tribe in Lake 
Simcoe, had expressed to Lieutenant Governor Maitland and 
W. Claus his desire to enjoy the benefits of a settlement 
for his people, Yellowhead petitioned, in part: 
"Our native brothers are desirous of 
forming a settlement ... It is our desire to 
come together, many of us have thrown aside 
our former habits and wish to adopt the 
habits of civilized lif8,,,vre shall then be 
enabled to pursue a regular system of agri-
culture and greater facilities will be 
afforded us in following the precepts of 
our religious teachers,'' (6) 
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The impulse behind the desire expressed by Yellow-
head is not hard to trace. After his success with the 
Credit Mission, Peter Jones, in 1826, held a Camp Meeting 
at Holland Landing with the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa. Although 
Jones did not immediately gain a large number of converts, 
Chief Yellowhead declared that his Indians were free to 
make their own decisions and that he would have made his 
by next spring. Chief Snake was converted at the meeting 
and promised to visit the Credit during the winter, Chief 
Snake then ing_uired as to when his people could expect to 
have a school.(?) 
By 1827 the Methodists had erected a temporary 
school house at Holland Landing, staffed by the teacher 
William Law. More than one hundred Lake Simcoe.Indians 
were "obedient to the faith" and the school had sixty 
scholars. In 1828, after being refused land at Holland 
Landing to establish a mission, in the words of Bishop 
Strachan "so long as they remained under the instruction 
of their present teachers"( 8 ) the Indians returned to a 
number of islands in Lake Simcoe still controlled by the 
Indian bands. Here a second school was established and 
and they were encouraged in animal husbandry and agriculture, 
The Lake Simcoe Ojibwa could not be entirely satis-
fied with their situation though. The Lake Simcoe Ojibwa 
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were still tied inextricably through a form of debt bondage 
to a number of French traders.(9) These traders resented 
the Methodist assumption of control and the economic loss 
they would entail should the Ojibwa abandon their hunting 
and trapping, P. Jones reports that in the early days of 
Methodist work traders were continually threatening beat-
ings if Ojibwa listened to the Methodist preaching.< 10 ) 
After their retreat to Yellowhead's Island the 
harassment of traders continued. Chief Yellowhead, in a 
memo to Chief Superintendent Givens in 1829, complained 
that two traders had cut down his lumber and offered it to 
him for sale. When Yellowhead complained these traders 
purportedly burned down a temporary chapel the Indians 
were using, 
The situation among the Lake Huron Ojibwa was 
little better. Many of John Aisance's band had come to 
meetings at Holland Landing. The band has also been 
visited regularly by Jones and other Methodist lay preachers. 
In 1828 James Currie was sent to establish a mission at 
Matchedash Bay and Peter Jones, after a visit in 1829, 
gives us this appraisal of their conduct: 
"The people are much devoted to the 
service of God. There have been no instances 
of intoxication among them since their con-
version, the leaders are very vigilant in 
the discharge of their duty." (11) 
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But, despite their orderly behaviour and the prox-
imity of the military station at Drummond Island and 
Penetanguishene, the Lake Huron Indians were also harassed 
and hindered in their transition by traders. Many of 
Aisence's tribe had also gotten irrevocably into debt. 
(By 1829 the total debt of the three tribes was one 
thousand and forty-four pounds 17 shillings.)( 12 ) These 
traders felt they had an economic position that could only 
be maintained by thwarting Methodist and Indian attempts 
to establish another economic base in agriculture. The 
traders realized their influence and control over the 
Ojibwa wou+d decline in direct proportion to that which 
the Methodist ministers were able to acquire. 
A magistrates' court in Newmarket on the 15th of 
August 1828 was the site of a drama which gives an indica-
tion of the type of conditions which prevailed as well as 
some insight into why the Ojibwa accepted both Methodist 
and later government protection. Chief Aisance had pressed 
charges against a French trader who had purportedly beaten 
an Indian severely. The magistrate summarily dismissed 
the case because the Indian could not remember the date 
upon which the beating purportedly occurred. As he was 
being dismissed Aisance protested: 
"I have been abused again and again by 
your people, and no notice has been taken of 
them for their bad conduct; I thought that 
the reason you did not take notice of us was 
because we were so wretched, ignorant and 
drunken, and consequently not worthy of re-
gard, but now our eyes are opened to see our 
miserable condition, and in seeing, we have 
endeavoured to forsake our former evil ways. 
I cannot suffer without having justice done 
to off enders . " ( 13) 
108 
It is probable that Aisance, Yellowhead and the 
other Ojibwa chiefs by now realized that they had to demon-
strate their capacity to participate in the society 
growing up around them in order to expect protection from 
that society. They also realized that they would need 
more powerful assistance than the iViethodist Society was 
able to offer. Indeed, the initial impulse for the 
Coldwater-Narrows Reserve was a product of John Aisance's 
and Anderson's agreement on this issue. Anderson wrote to 
Lieutenant Governor Colborne, through Chief Superintendent 
Givens from Penetanguishene early in 1829, He believed 
"the immediate establishment of a school 
for the Indians in this neighbourhood with 
its other advantages would be a great induce-
ment to the western Indians to settle within 
British territory, " ( 14) 
Anderson also informed Colborne that John Aisance 
had indicated he wished to settle his tribe at Matchedash 
Bay because it would afford "easy communication with his 
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brothers at Lake Simcoe':* He desired a school, some 
assistance and instruction in farming and a blacksmith for 
his people. Anderson further informed Colborne that 
"with one yoke of oxen, the assist-
and.e of the Indians and the Interpreter 
and blacksmith of the Indian Department, 
a temporary school house and forge could 
be built at a very small expense, perhaps 
plus or minus 20 to 25 pounds." (15) 
Anderson and the Indian Department embarked on the 
development of the reserve with some energy. By the spring 
of 1830 clearings for villages had been started at both the 
Narrows and Matchedash. Anderson had received permission 
to start the Indiars on construction of a road between the 
two, and to pay them two shillings per day for their work.(l 6) 
Throughout the summer of 1830 Anderson had about eighty 
Indians from the three different tribes working on the 
road,(l?) and work proceeded apace. 
That fall Chief Yellowhead sent Anderson the en-
couraging message that his tribe "intend to settle at the 
village you are building for us and end our days there and 
*Although the sheer bulk of Indian petitions for establish-
ments indicate that there was a genuine desire, one must 
approach each one with caution. Throughout the whole period 
both missionaries and employees of the Indian Department 
seemed to have created or altered petitions from the Ojibwa 
to suit their own purposes. 
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our children will be kept in school."(l 8) The following 
year Ojibwa from all the tribes had begun clearing spots 
on the road for houses,(l9) planting plots of potatoes 
around their houses and clearing land for a communal 
farm.(ZO) Anderson was able to report to Chief Superinten-
dent Givens that there were sixteen acres of corn, ten of 
oats, three of peas and four of spring wheat planted on 
the North River Flats near the Narrows and five acres of 
- potatoes at Coldwater. He told Givens he believed "there 
is every prospect of their having an ample supply of corn 
and potatoes for next winter.''(Zl) 
Throughout 1831 and the following year carpenters 
were at work constructing houses for the Indians and 
buildings for the establishment. A saw mill had been 
completed at Coldwater.(ZZ) By the spring of 1833 Anderson 
was able to give this encouraging description of the 
establishment. At the Narrows there were sixteen two-
family log homes built, eleven old log shanties and three 
wigwams. It had a Methodist meeting house and school, one 
frame house for Chief Yellowhead and sixty acres under 
cultivation. Coldwater had a meeting house and school 
house, Anderson's frame house, thirteen two-family log 
homes, six old log houses, a sawmill and one hundred and 
ten acres cultivated.(Z3) Anderson estimated that the 
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establishment produced approximately three to five hundred 
bushels of wheat.( 24-) Both the Narrows and Coldwater had 
a school, the Coldwater school being a government boarding 
school,( 2.5) and Anderson was in the process of establishing 
workshops to teach some of the Indians trades.( 26 ) 
The accomplishments of the establishment were 
impressive. It seemed the Ojibwa would soon be able to 
support the establishment from their own fields. They had 
access to religious instruction, schooling for their 
children, and assistance in farming. As important, the 
establishment afforded protection from the demands and 
harassment of traders and seemed to offer the Ojibwa legal 
recourse if they resumed. 
CHAPTER lO 
THE EXPERIMENT FALTERS 
Prompted by the petitions of Anderson, Yellowhead 
and Aisance, fostered by the initiatives of the Methodists 
and approved by a government determined to reduce expenses 
while maintaining the allegiance and affection of both 
resident and wandering Indians, the Coldwater-Narrows 
Reserve had a lot of roles to play and expectations to live 
up to. The encouraging accomplishments cited above on 
closer inspection hid a deeper malaise. Despite the accomp-
lishments, Coldwater-Narrows was rocked with conflicts 
from its very outset. 
Much of the problems encountered at Coldwater-Narrows 
can be traced to unrealistic expectations by Indian Depart-
ment officials, notably Anderson and Colborne, concerning 
tile speed and extent of transition expected of the Indians. 
The Ojibwa could not or would not live up to these expecta-
tions. 
One key to the expected success of the establishment 
was to be the road from the Narrows to Matchedash Bay. 
Anderson and Colborne believed the traffic between Lake 
Simcoe and Lake Huron was going to increase dramatically 
l12 
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in the next few years. They realized how important for the 
development of the colony a well-maintained road between 
these two points would be. This road would link shipping 
traffic on Lake Simcoe to that on Lake Huron and would be 
a strong incentive to direct settlement north from Toronto, 
along the route to Lake Simcoe. Thus the Coldwater-Narrows 
road was to be a belated fulfillment of Lieutenant Governor 
Simcoe's dreams. 
The government believed that by settling Indians 
along the road they would keep it maintained while estab-
lishing a transport business for themselves which would 
help support the enclave. From the beginning this scheme 
ran into problems. The maintenance of such a road was a 
serious burden on the Indians in the settlement. The 
colony had no funds to expend on the building or mainten-
ance of roads. In other parts of Upper Canada, throughout 
most of this period, settlers were required to keep the 
roads cleared along their farm as part of their settlement 
duties in order to receive clear title to land in the form 
of patents.( 1 ) Colborne hoped that the transport business 
and Indian Department pressure would compel the Ojibwa 
settled along the Coldwater road to do the same. 
To emphasize this intention Colborne, through 
Givens, informed Anderson: "You must on no account suffer 
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the houses to be so near to each other as to preclude the 
possibility of giving each family forty or fifty acres."(Z) 
But most of the incoming Ojibwa, accustomed to village life 
were not prepared to locate on isolated, detached farms. 
Yellowhead informed Anderson that only a few of the 
younger braves would settle along the road while the rest 
of the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa were planning to settle in the 
village at the Narrows. He argued convincingly that they 
would be too dispersed along the road to send their children 
to school. (3) 
At the Coldwater end Anderson fared a little 
better. Although originally wishing to establish in a 
village at Matchedash, Anderson was able to convince the 
Potaganasee who had accompanied him from Drummond Island, 
as well as some of Aisance's Ojibwa, to settle along the 
road a few miles from Coldwater. Because of their re-
luctance to be as isolated as fifty acre farms would demand 
the size of their lots was diminished. Thus their farms 
only stretched a little over three miles from Coldwater.(4) 
Consequently, for most of the fourteen miles the Coldwater 
road was to be untended by resident farmers. 
With a considerable amount of pressure, and the 
encouragement of the two shilling a day wage, Anderson was 
able to convince the Ojibwa to complete the initial clearing 
of the road. But the Indians consistently refused to 
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expend the capital needed to engage in the transport busi-
ness to any considerable extent.(.5) Consequently, by the 
spring of 1832, the road needed a considerable amount of 
repair. Although Anderson was given permission to expend 
twelve hundred pounds on this repair it was a cost which 
the Indian Department could not continue to bear and a 
problem which plagued the establishment throughout its 
existence. ( 6 ) 
Clearing for other purposes on the reserve was not 
attended with any more encouraging success. The original 
assumption had been that the Indians themselves were to 
clear room for the villages, farms and lots for individual 
houses. Initially the Indians again were to receive the 
wage of two shillings per day as well as provisions. By 
the spring of 1831 Anderson had decided to pay them by the 
clearing "for when employed by day, if someone does not 
superintend them they do not work one half of their time," 
and was finding that it was "impossible to satisfy them in 
respect to provisions."(?) Those working on the clearings 
were apt to abandon their work without notice to attend to 
other duties; hunting, fishing, and, in the first couple of 
years, to attend crops back on the island.( 3 ) As a result 
of the perceived unreliability of the Indian workers, by 
1832 most of the clearing was being done by white workmen, 
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costing between twelve and sixteen dollars an acre.(9) 
Of course the principal purpose behind the work 
being done at the establishment was to transform the 
Ojibwa into self-sufficient farmers and much of Superinten-
dent Anderson's efforts were expended with this object in 
mind. The description supplied earlier indicates that the 
establishment had considerable acreage under cultivation. 
Most of this acreage was poor agricultural land on the 
North River Flats of the Coldwater River, which had been 
resorted to in 1831 only after Anderson had decided that 
the Ojibwa were not going to be able to clear enough good 
land for a spring crop.(lO) Throughout the whole period 
of the establishment and despite Anderson's confident 
predictions the Coldwater·-Narrows was never able to produce 
enough crops to maintain itself.(ll) Much of this failing 
was due to a continuing reluctance on the part of the 
Ojibwa to abandon the former round of occupations; hunting, 
fishing and collecting maple syrup. Anderson was continu-
ally embarrassed by requests for returns from the settle-
ment as so often too many "were dispersed throughout the 
country" for Anderson to attempt it. (l 2 ) 
As late as 1836 Anderson had to report to the Chief 
Superintendent that the establishment was almost deserted 
of men as they had gone for their fall hunting.(lJ) Despite 
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almost constant beseeching by Anderson, who pointed to the 
industry of the white farmers around them, Yellowhead in 
1834 still refused to receive his tribe's annuities in the 
form of agricultural implements, although he did promise 
Anderson 
" ... in a year or two we shall be able 
to raise a sufficient supply (of wheat) and 
perhaps some to sell, and then we shall be 
happy to give up our land payments for the 
purposes you desire.''(14) 
Probably as important in discouraging Indian 
exertion in agriculture was the quality.of land throughout 
the settlement. The area around Matchedash proved too 
marshy for efficient cultivation. In the fall of 1831 
the decision was made to remove the establishment inland 
to Coldwater. Thus it was not until 1832 that the Ojibwa 
and Potoganasee could begin to clear and cultivate their 
lots. Conditions in Coldwater remained confused and un-
settled throughout most of that year.(i5) 
Despite the ease of clearing the North River Flats 
area the land surrounding the village at the Narrows was not 
well suited for agriculture either. In 1836 James Evans, 
a Methodist minister, gave us this assessment from the 
Narrows: 
"No wonder that the Indians here make 
but little improvement in farming, such a 
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thing being impractical - stony, sandy and 
swampy being almost the only quality of land 
being seen ... however good the design may 
have been in settling them here nothing much 
is more certain than that they can never make 
much improvement on their present location." ( 16) 
One of the major disappointments for Colborne was 
the lack of support given the government school at Cold-
water. Established in 1832, the school, a boarding school, 
was designed to be a model for Indian schools and one of 
the chief elements of the magnet that was to be Coldwater-
Narrows. The school, though, was rife with dissension and 
never well attended, For many parts of the year, when 
families were out of the community hunting or making sugar, 
it was almost deserted.( 17) 
Even at the best of times the school was not well 
supplied with pupils. Many parents were concerned about 
the care the children received at the boarding school after 
formal classes were over.< 18 ) Much of the reason for its 
poor success was due to quarreling between ve.rious religious 
factions (see next chapter) but almost as important was the 
reaction against the rather strict, coni'ining rules of the 
school. A good indication of the type of atmosphere created 
can be garnered from Anderson's missive to Givens stating 
"As it is highly desirable that the 
Boarders should be kept as much as possible 
within the limits of the school and under 
the eyes of the Teacher, a close boarded 
Fence should be made to enclose this 
building ... and so constructed as to ex-
clude all intercourse betwixt the Boys 
and Gir:).s." ( 19) 
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At the time there were only eight boys and twenty-one 
girls attending. 
Obviously Anderson was not receiving the type of 
cooperation he had hoped for. He was particularly upset 
about the growing opposition of the Potaganasee who had 
come from Drummond Island with him and with whom he thought 
he had developed a lasting trust. Anderson complained to 
Givens in 18J1 that the Potaganasee 
"were the most faithful and obedient 
Indians that I had ever met with, but I 
regret to say they have much changed, 
whether this is attributable to bad advice 
from the Indians of' this part of the coun-
try or whether the whites, whose interest 
it may be to keep them in slavish ignorance, 
have influenced them ... I cannot say." (20) 
Indeed early in the establishment Colborne had advised 
Anderson that if the opposition of' the Indians towards 
their designs continued he was to disband the establish-
ment.(Zl) Anderson Quickly communicated this warning to 
the various Ojibwa bands. 
What Anderson and Colborne were finding, of course, 
was that the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve could only be success-
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ful to the extent that they received the cooperation of 
the Ojibwa and Potaganasee involved. This cooperation 
would accrue depending on how closely the Ojibwa per-
ceived their aims reflected in those of Anderson and the 
Indian Department. 
There were a number of factors at work to limit 
Ojibwa trust in both Anderson and the Indian Department. 
One of the most important of these factors was a growing 
conflict between Anderson and the chiefs of the various 
tribes. A certain amount of tension between the two was, 
perhaps, inevitable. Anderson, in his role as Superinten-
dent, with the powers of patronage at his disposal, would 
have by necessity usurped some of the traditional chiefs' 
authority as he began to perform some of their functions. 
The situation at Coldwater-Narrows seems to have been 
heightened somewhat by Anderson's personality. The picture 
one emerges with after a perusal of Anderson's correspon-
dence is that o:f an intelligent, observant, perhaps 
dedicated, but also ambitious, demanding and authoritarian 
o:f:ficial. Anderson seemed determined to make Coldwater-
Narrows work and the high-handed manner in which he went 
about ensuring that it did was sure to create problems 
between him and the chie:fs. 
In the initial stages of the settlement, Anderson 
believed he had to use whatever pressure was at his dis-
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posal to encourage the Indians to work on the road, as 
we have seen, to the extent of threatening to end the 
establishment. Anderson also kept a tight rein on any 
income from the reserve. Although they never ventured into 
transport along the road to the extent either Anderson or 
Colborne wished, the Indians did periodically receive small 
amounts of income from transporting goods for settlers, 
This money Anderson kept for the establishment as a whole 
and despite petitions refused to divide it among the 
Indians.< 22 ) Anderson was also responsible for ensuring 
that chiefs and principal men were no longer to receive 
funds from the 'common stock' when they visited York. 
Anderson may have been correct in suggesting that this 
ready supply of cash, however small, prompted idleness on 
the part of the chiefs whom Anderson had hoped would be 
prime examples of industriousness, but his pointing it out 
to Givens did little to gain the chiefs' af'fections.( 23) 
A reflection of this rivalry is evident in Yellow-
head's demand that his house equal in every detail the 
frame house built for Anderson at Coldwater,( 24 ) Conflict 
between Yellowhead and Anderson reached its most dangerous 
point a year later. A brave of Yellowhead's tribe had 
been accidentally shot and killed by a Coldwater half-breed. 
Anderson immediately declared the half-breed guiltless and 
was supported in this decision by a coroner. The half-
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breed was probably innocent of any crime according to 
British law, but according to Ojibwa tradition he had 
deprived that family of the enjoyment and services of 
their son. Some atonement had to be made. Yellowhead 
demanded that the half-breed either come to live with the 
dead boy's family "to stem the grief" or die himself. The 
boy readily agreed to the former and joined Yellowhead's 
tribe despite Anderson's vigorous protests.( 25) 
While the antagonism between Yellowhead at the 
Narrows and Anderson seemed to die down, or at least 
remain buried, after this incident it steadily heightened 
between him, Chief Aisance and the Potaganasee Chief 
Tawquinine. This is partially a result of the more un-
settled situation at Coldwater, but more probably occurred 
because Anderson spent the vast majority of his time there. 
His closer proximity would insure that he would meddle 
more in affairs Aisance and Tawquinine felt their pre-
rogative. Thus he would have been perceived as more of a 
threat. 
In 1831 Aisance charged Anderson with accepting 
bribes at the annual present giving. Anderson, Aisance 
believed, "had always in the distribution of presents 
given liberally to these who brought presents [for him] 
and retained a portion from those who brought nothing ... ( 26 ) 
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Whether the charge was true or whether Anderson was 
simply participating in the traditional exchange of recip-
rocal presents, Aisance's charges created bitter feelings 
which never completely healed. Anderson's response to 
Givens concerning the charges is indicative, not only of 
the extent of Anderson's reactions but, possibily, his 
estimation of the charges under him. Anderson felt that 
"After serving His Majesty for upwards 
of seventeen years ... that my honesty and 
integrity should now be called into question 
by a worthless savage .•. is mortifying in the 
extreme."(27) 
By 1833 the relationship had deteriorated to such 
an extent that thirty eight Indians at Coldwater, led by 
Tawquinine and Aisance sent a petition to the Roman Catholic 
Bishop at York for Anderson's removal. The petition read 
in part: 
"The Indians don't come to this place 
because they know very well that everything 
don't go rite ... our Cap't when he wants 
anything it's always rite, and when we want 
anything we cant get it ... I tell you Father 
,,,we will go away from this place because 
we don't want him."(28) 
Trust in the Indian Department as a whole deterior-
ated throughout the six years of the settlement because of 
what was perceived as a failure to live up to promises made 
when inducing the Indians to settle on the reserve. Most 
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of this perceived defaulting was due to the rapidly 
increasing expenditures and consequent constraints placed 
on the monetary resources of the Indian Department. When 
the Colonial Office had transferred authority from the 
Indian Department in Upper Canada to the Lieutenant 
Governor they had originally informed Colborne that they 
wished to restrict the total expenditures for the Depart-
ment to eight thousand nine hundred pounds per annum. 
Colborne hastily replied that this restriction would ensure 
that any attempts to inculcate civilization among the 
Indians would be impossible. Following a furious round of 
pr·oposals and counter proposals the Colonial Office finally 
agreed to the sum of twenty thousand pounds. Although this 
new sum was an impressive increase over the original pro-
posal it was simply the amount spent on annuities, presents 
and salaries for the Department in the last year of military 
authority.(Z9) It was clear that any expenditures on the 
Coldwater-Narrows establishment must come from money 
slated for presents or annuities. 
Given this restriction on financing the problems 
that beset the reserve in the initial years, increasing 
expenses, caused great alarm at the Chief Superintendent's 
office. In 1SJ2 Givens warned Anderson "the heavy and 
embarrassing expenses incurred at that station ... have 
contributed in no ordinary degree to cripple the resources 
of the Department,"(JO) This warning came after Anderson 
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had already been advised that he must submit all expenses 
to be authorized by Givens and the Indians under his care 
should be warned that "they must soon cease to expect to 
be supplied with any food whatsoever from your stores."(3l) 
These restrictions made it difficult for Anderson 
to complete projects proposed for the establishment and 
already begun. The Department had promised the Indians 
they were to have log houses built for them if they came 
to join the establishment. Anderson ·continually had 
trouble in getting these houses constructed. It was almost 
impossible to find reliable workers at the rate the Depart-
ment was offering, considering the poor rations provided. 
Even after the Department had decided upon limiting cons-
truction to one house for two families wl th only· the out-
side hewn, the required number of houses were still not 
completed by the 1836 description cited earlier.<32 ) 
Anderson was also periodically forced to abandon 
clearing for farms when the Indian Department continued to 
restrict funds. In 1831 he was informed that Givens would 
only authorize an additional two hundred and fifty pounds 
for clearing, farming and planting. It was this communica-
tion which prompted Anderson to abandon clearing the better 
quality land near the village and the Narrows to plant on 
the relatively clear North River Flats.(33) As we have seen, 
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the Flats still accounted for the bulk of cultivated land 
in 1836. 
Of course none of the expenditures of the Coldwater-
Narrows Reserve really represented a further drain on the 
Colonial Office purse. All expenditures were charged 
against one of two accounts. Pay for school masters, 
workmen and instructors were to be charged against the 
saving on presents. Further expenses, such as purchases 
of oxen, horses, etc., were charged against annual payments 
for land.(34) The expenses at Coldwater-Narrows far ex-
ceeded the savings on presents and the Indian Department 
return on land purchased, but as the money was being deduc-
ted from a common pool and the Department was spending 
considerably less in other areas of the colony it seldom 
represented a drain above moneys allotted for the Indian 
Department. 
Rivalry and lack of trust between Anderson and the 
traditional chiefs of th~ Ojibwa tribes involved, coupled 
with a pervading skepticism concerning the interest of the 
Department as a whole due to their monetary restrictions, 
helped foster a generally disruptive and uncooperative 
spirit throughout the establishment. The Indians and the 
Department, as personified by Anderson, were no longer 
assured of a co!lh11on purpose and cooperation could not be 
guaranteed. Dissension pervaded every aspect of the 
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settlement. 
CHAPTER 11 
GOVERNMENT--MISSIONARY CONFLICT: 
CONTROL FOR CONTROL'S SAKE 
A great deal of the tension at the Coldwater-
Narrows establishment can be traced to competition between 
the Government and various religious sects for effective 
control of the Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa. The 
principal poles in this tension were the Methodists, 
Catholics, Church of England and Indian Department. The 
principal cause of this tension was that neither of these 
poles continued to view the Indian as simply converts 0r 
as potential settlers. They had come to represent power 
and influence in an increasingly bitter fight. 
As indicated in preceding chapters, much of the 
incentive for the Government's civilization policy came 
from their anxiety over the influence of the Methodists 
over their Indian converts. Partially due to the exertions 
of Peter Jones and partially because of the Ojibwa's 
search for a broker to help them alter their mode of life, 
to negotiate for them with authorities and to help stand 
between them and the harassment of white settlers and 
traders, the Methodists had be"n successful in establish-
ing missions among both the Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron 
Oji.bwa. 
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On Yellowhead's island in Lake Simcoe, under the 
missionary Atwood, the Methodist missions had been moder-
ately successful. They had removed themselves, at least 
partially, from the whites around them and had been able 
to encourage the cultivation of substantial crops.(i) 
They had also begun to make plans to establish an extensive 
fishery at the island. More importantly to the Methodists, 
the relative seclusion from the whites had assisted in 
helping them resist the enticement of whisky and had aided 
in keeping the Ojibwa constant in their devotional duties.( 2 ) 
The Methodists greeted Colborne's announcement of' 
the Ojibwa's impending removal to Coldwater-Narrows with 
suspicion and immediate opposition. George Ryerson, after 
a visit to Lake Simcoe, informed readers of The Christian 
Guardian the suggested move was: 
"much to be regretted. It has rather 
agitated and disarranged their minds in this 
incipient stage of their civilization and 
mental improvement. In their insular situ-
ation they are sufficiently removed from the 
white population for every beneficial pur-
pose." (3) 
Many Methodists believed, and rightly so, that the 
establishment of Coldwater-Narrows was a means to curb the 
expansion of Methodist missions into the northern Great 
Lakes, a first step in ensuring that these missions become 
i 
i: 
I 
I 
ii 
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Church of England stations.( 4) The Methodists were much 
disturbed at this perceived government intent, E. Ryerson 
warned the Indian Department and the Church of England that 
"In their barbarous and heathen state, 
missionaries of every denomination have an 
undoubted and equal right to visit, establish 
missions among and convert them ... But should 
one adventurous and philanthropic agricultur-
alist take peaceable possession of, actively 
and successfully cultivate a part of the 
unbroken soil for the sole benefit of his 
fellow creatures, would it be just, honourable, 
even tolerable for another professed philan-
thropist, under pretense of promoting the 
same benevolent object to force, directly or 
indirectly, the former to retire .•• let each 
break up and cultivate the ground for himself 
and let not him who folded his hands and 
slumbered, . , whilst his neighbor laboured, .. 
come at harvest gathering."(5) 
Ryerson left little doubt that he was referring to 
Indian Department designs for the Lake Simcoe and Huron 
Ojibwa. The Methodist missionaries consistently and 
steadfastly advised their charges not to accept the govern-
ment's invitation to settle at the new village. They only 
removed this opposition after Colborne, perceiving the 
Methodists had sufficient influence to thwart Department 
plans, assured them they would "never be interrupted in 
forming their schools or communicating religious instruc-
r /) 
tion. 11 \ 0 
With this assurance the Methodist ministers prepared 
for the dismemberment of their establishment and the move to 
1J1 
the Narrows. But it was a promise which Colborne could not 
possibly keep. To allow the Methodists freedom in religious 
instruction and teaching the young smacked too much of for-
feiting to them that influence Coldwater-Narrows was 
designed to negate. Anderson, particularly, had developed 
a distrust of the Methodists and was intent on removing 
their influence from the Indians who were now under his 
charge and of severing "the chain of American influence 
betwixt this part of the country and Michilimackinac."(7) 
Nevertheless the Department and Methodists seem to 
have devised a formula for effective cooperation at the 
Narrows. According to Colborne's assurances the Methodists 
were to have use of the school-meeting house built by the 
government at the Narrows. Although they bridled at the 
delay involved and at not being allowed to prepare their 
station before the arrival of the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa, they 
did work in a reasonably cooperative atmosphere. 
It was not long, though, before this cooperation 
became lost in the struggle for influence which character-
ized Indian Department-Methodist encounters throughout 
Upper Canada. By October of 1BJ1 the Methodist minister 
and teacher, Gilbert Miller; was preparing to move into 
the almost finished structure designed for the Methodists.(B) 
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This precipitated one incident in an increasingly violent 
conf'lict between the Methodists and the government farmer 
Gerald Alley. Anderson was away from the Narrows portion 
of the establishment most often and communication between 
the two was not always easy. Consequently, Alley, although 
hired as the farming instructor, was compelled to perform 
many of the duties Anderson would have and to manage the 
day to day affairs of the Narrows establishment. He was 
originally given charge of the school house, with clear 
instructions from Colborne that it was to be used ex-
clusively by the Methodists.(9) When the Methodists pre-
pared to occupy the school they discovered that Alley had 
been using it as a work shop. Their complaints to Alley 
had no effect until Anderson, after receiving a petition, 
ordered him to remove the workmen.(lO) 
Alley's reluctance to hand over the school to the 
Methodists was partially the result of a very open and 
virulent power struggle between himself and the ministers. 
George Ryerson and James Richardson, in April of 1832, had 
charged Alley with extracting exorbitant prices from the 
Indians for some horses he had sold. They added that 
Alley was periodically drunk and that his loose morality 
was a bad inf'luence on the Narrows Indians.(ll) 
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Later in the same month the underlying cause of the 
conflict came to a head. The Government, as already stated, 
was primarily interested in strengthening the affections of 
the Indians and reducing costs. They perceived that 
inculcating habits of industry and ambition, transforming 
the Indian into a pioneer farmer, was the most effective 
means of accomplishing this. The Methodists, though, 
believed that although one of their by-products was the 
development of agricultural missions, the ultimate end was 
the permanent adherence of the Ojibwa to the Methodist 
Church, to following their devotional duties, to leading 
a saved life, pious and serious. Consequently the Metho-
dists, Alley believed, occupied far too much of the Indians' 
time in devotional exercises rather than agricultural 
pursuits. It was this basic difference which led to the 
most serious confrontation between Alley and Methodists at 
the Narrows. The Methodist minister, James Richardson, 
concerned about what he perceived as a lack of religious 
ardour among Yellowhead's Indians, had tried to impress 
them with the importance of remaining in that state of 
salvation. In so doing he informed them that all the 
Government, and particularly Alley, had done for them was 
of no use if they did not follow the precepts of the Church 
and ;th.us remain in the Lord's graces. If they strayed 
from this path, they were informed, they might as well drive 
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their oxen and wagons into the lake f'or all the good they 
had done them.( 12 ) Given the high state of' tension between 
the Government and the Methodists, this advice was consid-
ered to be highly suspect by both Alley and, when inf'ormed 
of' it, Anderson, Anderson inf'ormed Givens that 
"their object in so doing was ... to pre-
judice the Indians and prevent them if' possible 
f'rom receiving religious instruction or any 
temporal advantages f'rom any other than 
Methodists."(13) 
Although f'uror over this incident gradually diminished, the 
Methodists and Alley remained in open conf'lict and in 
competition f'or their charge8 until Alley's resignation in 
July of' 1832, (l 4) 
Again though it was Coldwater which proved to be 
the arena f'or the bulk of' the religious divisions buf'f'eting 
the establishment. The Methodists had established a nascent 
mission at Matchedash, under James Currie, bef'ore the 
government decision to set up the reserve. As at the 
Narrovrs they were partially appeased by Colborne's 
assurance to Peter Jones in 1830 that the department "would 
leave their religious instruction to the Methodists."(l5) 
But thi.s appeasement did not last long. On 25 June 1830 
Peter Jones met a Reverend Archibold, a Church of' England 
minister sent by Colborne to be a missionary at Matchedash. 
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He was also informed that a Mr. Hamilton had been appointed 
school master there. In the words of Peter Jones: 
"I was very much astonished to hear that 
there was going to be an interference with 
the labours of the Methodist Missionaries 
among the Indians, that they had been instru-
ments of reforming them, and that I was more 
surprised to hear these things, as the 
Governor had repeatedly said that it was not 
his intention to meddle with the spiritual 
Instructions of the Indian." (16) 
From this point cooperation between Anderson, the 
Indian Department and the Methodists at Coldwater com-
pletely disappeared. When the establishment moved from 
Matchedash to Coldwater, James Currie had to petition 
repeatedly for a grant of land to build a mission house, (l?) 
and performed his duties as minister and teacher for some 
time from a bark wigwam. Currie, like Mitchell at the 
Narrows, was also often censored for occupying too much 
o:f the Indians' time with "devotional exercises", 
particularly by Captain Phillpots of the Royal Engineers at 
Penetanguishene,(lS) while Currie continually complained to 
the Department concerning the unsettled manner in which the 
establishment was being run believing that it retarded "the 
progress of religious and moral improvement."(l9) 
A great deal of trouble at Coldwater was centred 
around government plans for the school. For the Methodists, 
of course, having control over the education of the children 
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was an important element in maintaining the allegiance of 
both young and old to the Methodist precepts of religion. 
The Indian Department at first claimed that the government 
school erected at Coldwater was meant only for the Poto-
ganasee and any other northern tribes which wished to join 
the establishment. They left the doors open to Aisance's 
tribe if they wished but if the Methodists would not agree 
to that the Department would build another structure for 
them "trusting that the Missionary appointed to that 
important Station will be a person of mild and concilia-
~ory Deportment. 00 ( 2o) But when Aisance had petitioned 
Anderson to allow Currie to use part of the school building 
to instruct, Anderson would only reply that a Mr. Rowe, 
replacing Hamilton, was the teacher, but that anybody 
qualified wishing to assist would be welcome. Although 
Anderson maintained the Indians were perfectly satisfied 
with this arrangement, Currie was not. He insisted 
Anderson was intruding "on ground that they had occupied ... ( 2l) 
Partially because of Currie's continued refusal to 
encourage the Methodist Ojibwa to send their children to 
the government school attendance at that school remained 
dismally small. Finally, in May of 1834, Anderson penned 
a warning to Givens. Jt read in part: 
"I do not consider any Indian school in 
the country of so much importance as this ... 
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But before any good of consequence can 
be done either at this school or the one at 
Narrows; a change must be made ... for so long 
as the same family as it were, having teaching 
from sects at variance with each other ... The 
Indians will remain in doubt with whom to close 
and thus their children be kept in ignorance 
and trained in uncontrollable idleness." (22) 
Anderson suggested that the Church of England send 
a proper missionary and teacher and the Methodists be 
forced to withdraw. If this could not be done he reluc-
tantly recommended that they give it up to the Methodists. 
This feuding between Anderson, the Indian Depart-
ment and the Methodists was not restricted to the school. 
By 1832 it was becoming obvious in other areas. Government 
opposition to the Methodists in general had hardened by 
this time. Although the Upper Canadian Methodists were no 
longer as overwhelmingly American as they had been shortly 
after the war, the taint of that association still remained. 
Just as important was a perception by the government and 
Church of England, predominantly erroneous, that the 
Methodists were staunch supporters of the Reformers in 
Upper Canada. This belief persisted despite the consider-
ations of such a prominent Methodist as John Ryerson that 
"we have reasons to respect Sir John 
Colborne and it is our duty and interest 
to support the Government ... And as it 
respects the Re:formers, so called, take 
Bidwell and Rolph from them and there is 
not scarcely one man of character, Honour 
or even decency among them, but with very 
few exceptions ... they are a banditti of 
compleat vagabonds. ,,"(23) 
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This perception led Anderson to inform the Method-
ist Indians at Coldwater that the Methodist missionaries 
were working against the Lieutenant Governor. When Currie 
learned of this he posted a series of protests, but when 
confronted Anderson blandly told Currie that it was his 
duty to inform the Indians. He had simply been reading 
and translating newspapers to them.(z4 ) This incident led 
Methodists to believe it was at the Narrows and Coldwater 
"that the most invidious exertions have 
been made by a few interested and designing 
individuals to turn away the attention of 
the Indians under our charge from the doctrine 
and precepts of the Gospel, as they have 
learned them, " ( 25) 
The situation at Coldwater was heightened by another 
avenue of religious tension. As indicated earlier the 
Ojibwa on Drummond Island, the Potaganasee, had been 
converted in the eighteenth century by Jesuit priests. 
They had been confirmed in that faith over the years by 
periodic visits of Roman Catholic priests. By the time 
of the withdrawal from Drummond Island to Matchedash, in 
line with regular Catholic practice, Bishop MacDonald had 
appointed a Potaganasee chief, Tawquinine, as a lay member 
of the church, charged with looking to the spiritual wel-
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fare of his people. It was a charge and a prerogative 
that Tawquinine guarded jealously as it was a means of 
maintaining his traditional powers amidst the changing 
conditions the Ojibwa were faced with. Bishop MacDonald 
defended his control over the Catholic Indians as closely 
as the Methodists did over theirs, if a little less 
vigorously. He wrote a memo to Tawquinine warning that 
"you have been informed by me and every 
other priest that taught you religion that 
no other religion could be good but the 
Catholic Religion, if any men tell you that 
every religion be good you must not believe 
him and you will tell the Indian not to 
believe him.'' (26) 
Anderson reported this letter seemed to have great 
influence on the Catholic Indians and they gathered to-
gether frequently to reread it.( 27) 
In 1830 Archibald feared that the Potaganasee would 
ask for a Roman Catholic teacher and thus "take the 
education of their children out of our own hands." He 
blamed their opposition on Aisance who "has poisoned the 
minds of his own people as well as the Potaganasee" and 
felt the best way of counteracting this opposition would 
be to have Indians loyal to the Church of England brought 
to Matchedash and "by virtue of' the advantages shown to 
induce others to join ... ( 2S) Unfortunately, at this time 
it would have been dif'f'icult for the Indian Department to 
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recruit any significant number of Ojibwa that adhered to 
the Church of England.( 29) 
Conflict between the Catholic Indians and the 
Department at Coldwater continued to grow. Aisance was 
drawn more and more under the influence of Tawq_uinine and 
further from the restrictions of the Methodist, Currie, 
It appears that as he extricated himself from these fetters 
he and Tawq_uinine began to engage in drinking bouts and, 
generally, showed little industry and intention to cooper-
ate on the establishment. 
Finally, considering Aisance to be an unwelcome 
influence on the rest of the Methodists, Currie expelled 
him from the society. (JO) Aisance' s expulsion created a.n 
interesting situation. The accepted form for Methodist 
success among Ojibwa had been to devote much energy to 
co-opting the traditional chiefs. In many instances 
chiefs and principal men were quick to accept conversion 
to the Methodist faith, viewing it as another way of 
extending their traditional paramount position. The con-
version of both the Lake Simcoe and Huron Ojibwa had 
followed this form faithfully. But now, with Aisance's 
expulsion, the Methodists lost one of the forces lending 
it legitimacy in the p8rception of the Ojibwa. They were 
being asked, implici tl;y, by both Methodists and Aisance 
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to choose between traditional authority and a usurper, but 
one which had proven more effective in dealing with the 
changed circumstances. The reaction of Aisance's tribe 
seems to have been mixed. Although Aisance had enough 
influence to force Currie to resign(Jl) Anderson reports 
that some members of his tribe would no longer obey 
Aisance's orders.(32 ) There is no doubt that both Aisance 
and the Methodists, despite the arrival of John Ryerson 
to perform Currie's duties, lost influence due to this 
action,(JJ) and the Lake Huron Ojibwa had lost a degree of 
that cohesiveness needed to supply accepted direction 
. ' 
With Aisance now nominally Roman Catholic and 
joining forces with Tawquinine, Anderson, the Department 
and the Church of England teachers were met with firmer 
opposition from that quarter. The Catholics began to 
interrupt the school, demanding that separate prayers be 
said for the Catholic children. They eventually removed 
their children, charging that the teacher was more atten-
tive to the Methodist children. (Ji}) Al though the 
Catholic children were sent back to the school periodically 
the attendance remained disappointingly small. Two years 
later, in 1834, Anderson reported to Givens the school was 
still doing poorly because of "an excitement which has 
been kept up by Tawquinine's religious bigotry.n(J5) By 
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1836 the school was no longer operating and had not been 
for some time.(36 ) 
This type of conflict had a serious effect on other 
sectors of the establishment. Although Anderson had 
originally been impressed with the industry the Catholics 
were showing in preparing their farms, as Tawquinine, 
Aisance and Anderson increasingly opposed each other this 
cooperation ended. In 1833 Anderson reported to Givens 
that both Aisance and Tawquinine had.on more than one 
occasion sent to the Narrows for alcohol,(37) Conditions 
grew worse. By the next year Anderson reported that the 
Catholics were idling about while the others were working. 
He believed "that the correspondence kept up between these 
. (JS' people and Bishop MacDonald is productive of much evil," ' 1 
At the same time as relations were deteriorating 
between Anderson and the Ojibwa another source of conten-
tion emerged within the establishment. After Aisance was 
forced out of the Methodist camp relations between the two 
bands, the Methodist Ojibwa and the Catholic Potaganasee, 
grew increasingly taut, Much of this tension centred 
around the use of the school house for worship on Sundays. 
The original agreement had been that the Catholics would 
have its use until ten-thirty at which time the Methodists 
would be granted its use for two hours. By 1836 the 
arrangement was breaking down. The Catholic Indians were 
continually staying late and barring the Methodists from 
entry when time for their worship came.(39) This sort of 
behaviour indicates a growing rankling which had pervaded 
all other aspects of the establishment. 
Although, as we have seen, the establishment at 
Coldwater-Narrows was meant to be a showplace to induce 
western tribes to settle at the reserve and on British 
territory, it could hardly on its present footing have 
accomplished this purpose. The Methodist ministers and 
the Indian Department were in constant opposition, both 
intensely jealous of any growing influence on either side 
and both innately conscious that, given the political 
structure in Upper Canada, no long term cooperation was 
possible. Their constant feuding created an element of 
uncertainty and impermanence to the establishment which 
diminished the trust and cohesiveness needed for its 
success. 
This feeling of uncertainty and the religious 
tension which caused it were heightened by the added oppo-
sition to Government plans by elements of the Catholic 
Potaganasee. Fed by 'Pawquinine' s and, later, Aisance 's 
resentment of the perceived usurpation of some of their 
traditional authority by Anderson, it grew into a dis-
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ruptive element which affected the whole establishment and 
helped cause the abandonment of one key to success as per-
ceived by the Indian Department, the school. This growing 
tension helped create a rift in relations, previously 
amiable, between the Potaganasee and Ojibwa. 
All of these divisions were inherently the result 
of a number of power struggles between influential sectors 
which had lest sight of the professed aim of the establish-
ment, the answer to Ojibwa petitions for assistance in 
their attempt to change their mode of life, adapt to the 
burgeoning society around them and provide a future for 
their children within it. These divisions not only pre-
vented much real achievement from developing along these 
lines on the reserve, they helped insure that it would be 
unable to deal effectively with the pressures which were 
increasingly coming to bear upon it from outside of the 
establishment. 
CHAPTER 12 
WHITE ENCROACHMENT AND HARASSMENT 
Originally one of the most pressing incentives 
which had prompted the Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron Ojibwa 
to petition the government for assistance was the diffi-
culties the Ojibwa were experiencing with white settlers 
and traders around them. They had foreseen they would 
need powerful assistance in creating a buffer between 
themselves and the settlers who were spreading northward. 
Coldwater-Narrows was not, even in 1830, so removed from 
this spread that the government, intent on creating the 
reserve, should not have foreseen they would need to ex--
pend considerable energy in erecting and maintaining that 
buffer. That they were not prepared to do so was one of 
the most pressing of the initial reservations about the 
establishment on the part of both Ojibwa and Methodist 
advisers. That they were not prepared to do so proved to 
be, in the end, one of the principal reasons for the 
break-up of the establishment. 
Simcoe County, through the northern part of which 
the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve ran, was the site of con-
siderable immigration in the late 182D's and 18JO's. It 
was an area promoted for settlement by the government of 
11e5 
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the colony itself. A road running from Lake Simcoe to the 
military establishment at Penetanguishene was considered 
by the Colonial Government to be of prime economic and 
military importance to the colony.( 1 ) Consequently, after 
the war of 1812 the government, in an effort to keep the 
road open at little cost, offered lots along this road to 
any indigent settlers who wished to take up location there.( 2 ) 
As early as 1818 a number of recent immigrants from the 
United Kingdom were settled along the road. At the same 
time the government had surveyed concession lines running 
• 
parallel to this road, offering lots on these concessions 
to indigent settlers, awarding many of them as militia 
grants to veterans of the war of 1812.(3) Similarly, the 
government offered sizable lots along the shores of Lake 
Simcoe to officers of the Imperial soldiery retiring on 
half pay. (4 ) 
Beginning in 1818 the govern"llent had also fostered 
the growth of a sizable Black community on concession lines 
near Penetanguishene Road. (5) Near Coldwater settlement 
had begun to spread south from Penetanguishene where a 
considerable community of commuted regular soldiery had 
been settled since the first decade after the war.( 6) 
Consequently by the late 1820's the previously remote 
back environs of the Home District had begun to fill up 
with settlers. 
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During the early and mid-thirties, Upper Canada 
experienced considerable accelerated immigration from the 
United Kingdom, Between 1825 and 1846 over six hundred 
thousand immigrants had left the United Kingdom, most of 
them entering Upper Canada.(?) This immigration was felt 
in the area around Coldwater-Narrows by successive waves 
of first Scottish then Irish settlers.( 8 ) These settlers 
quickly took up what unlocated lots were available and by 
the mid-18JO's only the odd lot remained in the hands of 
the crown. 
This rapid settlement in the area between Lake 
Simcoe and .Lake Huron held grave portent for the Ojibwa in 
the Coldwater-Narrows establishment. Even before the 
reserve had been designated a number of lots in the area 
encompassed by its boundaries had been surveyed and 
located, Many had been purchased by the Canada Company, (9) 
In the initial phase of the settlement the Indian Depart-
ment was careful to extinguish claim on the lots for non-
performance of settlement duties. Givens directed Anderson 
to complete a careful inspection to insure that none of 
the original locatees would be able to claim the lots 
after becoming aware that the area was being improved by 
the Indians and the Department,(lO) 
148 
Although the careful manner in which the Depart-
ment took possession of the property prevented any such 
subsequent claims being made they were unable to prevent 
the settlement of the area around the reserve and the 
resultant problems for the Ojibwa. One of the gravest of 
these involved the efforts the Indians were making to 
remain temperate. Alcohol was a way of life among pioneer 
settlers and traders in Upper Canada to an extent that is 
hard to imagine today.(il) -Rum could be purchased readily, 
cheaply and all too often seemed to relieve the often 
terrifying isolation and unending drudgery of pioneer life, 
Although Anderson was able to insure that nobody sold 
alcohol within the limits of the establishment he had no 
such control over the neighbouring areas. Both Anderson 
and Colborne were continually being pressed with petitions 
from both the Indian chiefs and Methodists to control the 
trade in alcohol around their settlement,(iZ) but neither 
could devise an effective means of preventing the distri-
bution. 
The situation at the Narrows was particularly 
discouraging. A village had sprung up, fostered by the 
lake traffic and the Coldwater Road, very close to the 
Indian settlement. There were at least three shops in the 
village dispensing large amounts o.f alcohol. (l3) It was 
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particularly vexing to the Narrows Ojibwa, most newly 
converted to Methodism and just recently sworn to abstin-
ence, to be within sight and hearing of the often rowdy 
and drunken white settlers. The situation was well 
summed up by James Evans in a letter to the Christian 
Guardian, He reported that the Ojibwa 
"are constantly exposed to temptation 
of that nature which is perhaps with them 
the most difficult to resist. A village 
settled by the whites is 'within a few rods 
in the rear of the Indian village and chapel, 
where, during Divine service in the evening 
,,,[they can be seen] carousing to no small 
annoyance to their once savage neighbours, 
and one mounted on a stump was heard voci-
ferating 'come here Indians, come and take 
some whisky' . " ( 14) 
In the first years of the establishment, while 
belief in its success and devotion to the Methodist faith 
were strongest, surprisingly few Ojibwa seem to have been 
enticed by such baiting. But as faith in the establish-
ment and doctrine declined in later years*, more and more 
* The high point of Methodist activity in Upper Canada 
came shortly after 1813, As more immigrants arrived from 
the United Kingdom and less from the United States the 
relative influence of the Methodist Conference declined. 
Because of this, and despite merging with the Wesleyan 
Methodists in 18Ji.J,, the cost of Methodist missions became 
extremely pressing on the conference, By the final days 
of the establishment the Narrows no longer had a resident 
missionary and was served by a circuit rider. (15) 
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of Yellowhead's Indians began again to sell their 
possessions to the rum traders,(! 6) for the brief escape 
that their wares afforded. 
The problems with encroachment and harassment 
were heightened by the growing importance of' the village 
near the Narrows. Anderson had originally tried to dis-
courage traders from settling in the area by establishing 
a government controlled fur depot which would purchase 
furs from the Indians at better prices than the traders. 
Unfortunately he could never get full approval for this 
scheme from the Chief Superintendent and the Indians were 
forced to deal with many of the same traders who had 
abused them previously. In the first __ years both Aisance 
and Yellowhead were under almost constant pressure to 
repay debts to the traders incurred before the settlement 
had been established. This pressure only ended when, with 
Anderson's approval, they used money from land payments to 
liquidate them,(l?) 
Probably of more serious consequence, the village 
near the Narrows had become a stopping off place for many 
of the new immigrants waiting for transportation to Lake 
Huron or further north.(lS) Most of these waiting 
immigrants, poor, having recently suffered the tortuous 
voyage from Britain, had little to subsist on during their 
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usually brief stay near the Narrows. Naturally enough, 
they often took whatever they could get a hold of to ease 
their discomfort. This often meant long bouts in the 
grog shops, but just as often meant encroaching on Indian 
property, In 1832 Alley had written to Anderson describ-
ing Indian complaints " ... the milking of their cows by the 
emigrants, the spoiling of canoe barks and damaging their 
canoes, - the pulling of their wagons out of order - and 
the abomination of intemperance ..... (l9), 
A frightening aspect of this tide of immigrants 
periodically erupted. The unsanitary conditions in which 
their passage had been made and the sheer masses of 
humanity involved exposed many of these immigrants to the 
great epidemic diseases. They occasionally brought these 
diseases with them to their encampment at the Narrows where 
the even more susceptible Indians were endangered. The 
most serious of these incidents occurred when, in August 
of 1832, ninety-four emigrants were encamped about the 
village at the Narrows. A cholera epidemic broke out 
among them. By the end of August, although only eleven 
cases had been confirmed among the Ojibwa, in the words of 
Anderson, "the Indians and whites are panic struck and 
many· have 1 eft the place in fear ... the children have all 
-(20) . been taken from the school," Only the fortuitous 
arrival of two immigrant doctors who laboured among the 
1.52 
stricken throughout the month prevented a much more 
serious situation from developing, As long as the immi-
grants were landing near the establishment the possibility 
of raging epidemic lingered. 
At Coldwater, al though the establishment f'ared 
much better in this respect, it was by no means immune 
from such problems. Traders from Penetanguishene were 
occasionally bringing whisky into the establishment, most 
often for the use of the workmen engaged in construction, 
but occasionally a number of Indians would be intoxicated 
in return for whatever possessions they could dispose of. 
Perhaps more seriously, there was almost a constant 
battle to keep neighbouring settlers from harvesting some 
of the Indian's crops; This was particularly true of both 
planted and wild hay on the flats of th8 l\lls.tchedash River. 
The establishment at Coldwater was a few miles from the 
flats at Matchedash Bay, separated from it by the eight 
hundred acres granted to Anderson as a United Empire 
Loyalist. Despite warnings from both Aisance and Anderson, 
white settlers, usually from Penetanguishene, periodically 
(22) 
robbed these flats of their crops. 
The final and most serious fear that the proximity 
of their white neighbours occasioned was for continued 
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control of their land. The Lake Simcoe and Lake Huron 
Ojibwa were, of course, given assurances in the initial 
days of the settlement concerning the security of the 
establishment. But as whites continued to pour into the 
areas around them, and as the immediate neighbourhood 
became settled and improvements made on the lots, the 
Indians began to view their land, much of it not improved 
and visibly unoccupied, with growing apprehension. Al-
though there were few instances of actual white occupation 
of Indian land, rumours of impending Indian Department 
abandonment of the establishment grew increasingly common 
as the land became obviously more valuable. This appre-
hension was only heightened by Indian Department refusal 
to deposit with either the Indian bands or with individual 
Indians title to the lands they occupied, 
As early as 1832, just two short years after the 
inception of the establishment, elements of the Indian 
bands had petitioned Colborne to be removed from the estab-
lishment. Anderson, in explanation to Colborne, believed 
the petition originated from the belief that the crown was 
not in total control of the land being used for the 
settlement and that the Indians would eventually be forced 
to move.(Z3) Anderson did agree with the petition that if 
a place totally distinct i'rom the whites could be found it 
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would produce "general satisfaction" among both Indians 
and whites in the area.<z4) Again in 1832, Yellowhead 
at the Narrows made a speech sent to Colborne "praying 
for a removal" and suggesting that "all the Indians 
below this, could be induced to collect in one spot and 
their present settlement sold to establish them in one 
body."(Z5) 
Similar fears, and a desire for one large settle-
ment, prompted a significant portion of Aisance's tribe 
to inform Anderson they intended to join other Ojibwa 
at Owen Sound. These families were warned they could 
not expect any government assistance in their new loca-
tion, and further, the "province is so rapidly filling up" 
that they would shortly again have to encounter the 
intrusion of the whites.< 26 ) They were eventually only 
induced to stay at the establishment by the assurance 
they would be able to retain documents about the extent 
of their land and, a promise never kept, that they would 
be provided with separate schools for their children. 
Despite this decision to stay, the latter years 
of the establishment were marked by predictions from 
both Anderson and Methodist observers that the Indians 
would eventually be pushed from their location and the 
indigent settlers would reap the benefits intended for 
the Indian.(Z7) 
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The efforts of the Ojibwa and the Potaganasee 
became increasingly preoccupied with ensuring this 
eventuality did not occur, or that if they were forced 
to remove they would have already prepared another 
location of their choice. Consequently less and less 
time and energy were spent on the development of the 
establishment. Anderson continually complained to Givens 
as the situation of the establishment was perceived to 
become more precarious, the Indians would work reason-
ably diligently on their own individual plots but would 
not put any effort into communal elements of the esta-
blishment. He often had to feed the cattle at Coldwater 
himself as there was nobody else prepared to do it.· 
In 1834, many of the Ojibwa petitioned Anderson 
that they be allowed to settle on fifty acre lots for 
which they would hold the title deed as a safeguard 
against the abandonment of the establishment. Although 
the Department was not adverse to dispersing the Indians 
on fifty acre lots - it was the original intent - they 
steadfastly refused, as they did throughout all of Upper 
Canada, to supply the Indian with title deeds.(ZB) Not 
given security in their possessions they again began to 
petition, along with the Methodists,for one large enclave 
for all Ojibwa in Upper Canada, either at Saugeen or at 
Narrows-Coldwater, the feeling being the increased size 
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of the establishment, the greater Indian population, would 
provide further protection against encroachment. 
This was the state of the establishment, rocked by 
dissension, plagued by the harassment of white settlers, 
traders and whisky sellers, directly in the path of waves 
of indigent immigrants and pa:::-alyzed by a fear for the 
loss of their land, when in 1836 Sir Francis Bond Head was 
appointed, perhaps part of one colossal mistake, Lieuten-
ant Governor of Upper Canada and, thus, the immediate 
arbitrator of Indian Affairs in the Province. 
CHAPTER 13 
THE GREAT MANITOULIN 
The Rawson Report, in its brief summary of 
Coldwater-Narrows, decided that 
"the encroachments of the white settlers 
on the line of the road opened by the Indians 
themselves, and the ill usage and pernicious 
example to which they were exposed at their 
hands, induced these tribes to abandon their 
settlements and to seek elsewhere a refuge 
from contamination of their more civilized 
white neighbours," (1) 
but the real reason for the abandonment of the government's 
first agricultural reserve was actually much more complex. 
Anderson and Colborne had always been particularly 
interested in extending their 'civilization policy' to the 
Ojibwa tribes to the northwest. This, as we have seen, 
was one of the purposes of the Coldwater-Narrows establish-
ment and a prime consideration in determining its location. 
While it became obvious that Coldwater-Narrows was not to 
play the role of magnet it had originally been slated for, 
Anderson and Colborne's interest in the northern Indians 
was not diminished. As early as 1830 Anderson had directed 
a missionary from the New England Society, who had con-
sulted Anderson, to Manitoulin, suggesting it would soon 
be a proper avenue for his exertions as a group of Ottawa 
were preparing to settle there.(Z) 
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In 1831 Anderson transmitted a petition from Chief 
Yellowhead and Aisance to Colborne. The petition urged 
Colborne to deprive some of the northerly Indians of their 
presents in an effort to force them to adopt the ci vili?,ed 
life.(3) Although it is true that Aisance and more often 
Yellowhead had periodically made trips to the northern 
Indians to exhort them to adopt agriculture and become 
settled, this petition parallels Anderson's interests so 
closely that it is difficult not to see his hand in its 
formation. 
Two years later the Reverend Adam Elliot, 
supported by the 'Society for Converting and Civilizing 
the Indians and Propagating the Gospel Among the Destitute 
Settlers in Upper Canada', embarked, on Anderson's prompt-
ing, from Coldwater to Manitoulin Island. By the follow-
ing year Rev. Elliot reported to Anderson he had about 
two hundred Ottawa and Ojibwa prepared to settle on 
Manitoulin Island and wished government assistance. ( i.J.) 
In the Fifth Report to the Society in 1835 Elliot reported 
the growing prospects of a mission on the lllanitoulin and 
further informed the Society that Anderson had for some 
time been urging the settlement and "volunteered himself 
for superintendent."(5) 
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Indeed, Anderson had become increasingly preoccupied 
with the prospect of settlement on Manitoulin Island. 
Just two short years after the beginning of the Coldwater-
Narrows experiment Anderson suggested to Colborne that the 
Indians under his charge would do much better if they were 
"all established out of the limits of the white settlement ... ( 6 ) 
From this point Anderson periodically penned suggestions to 
Colborne for the establishment of one large enclave on 
Manitoulin Island, suggestions received with interest. 
In 1835 Anderson made his final and successful 
pitch for an establishment on the Manitoulin. Anderson 
suggested to Colborne that he was prompted in this sugges-
tion by the "conviction that it was necessary to take some 
immediate steps for the Civilization of the Indians as 
well as to prevent the Total Extinction of their Race." 
Anderson's lengthy justification for faith in the prospects 
of success for an establishment on the Manitoulin is worth 
quoting at some length for the insight it gives of the 
expected character of that establishment. Anderson began 
his report to Colborne with an encouraging report of the 
progress at Coldwater-Narrows. He says, in part, despite 
disappointments about its progress expressed by some 
quarters "it is only by keeping in view their actual state 
before measures were taken to assist their civilization 
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that any fair estimate can be formed." He goes on to 
assert that from "a state bordering [constantly] on 
starvation" they had progressed until now "every Indian 
throughout the Establishment is possessed of the means 
with moderate industry of providing himself with an ample 
supply of food and clothing and he has acquired sufficient 
knowledge of the arts of civilized life to avail himself 
of these advantages, ,.(7) 
Anderson used these observations to conclude, 
"the Indian wants instruction. He everywhere appreciates 
the superiority of the whites in possessing the arts of 
reading and writing. He earnestly begs for the benefits 
of education" and is able to benefit from it. He 
suggested the Indian in Upper Canada had been deprived 
of their land, not without payment, "but that payment has 
been that of a careful and prudent worldly man making a 
bargain with an improvident spend thrift."(S) Just as 
importantly, many of the Indian allies from the north 
had visited Penetanguishene, had seen the benefits civili-
zation could supply and wished similar considerations. 
Anderson felt the claims of all these Indians could be 
most easily satisfied by the creation of one large estab-
lishment on Manitoulin Island. 
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Most importantly, the Manitoulin was chosen not 
only because it was well removed from settlement and had 
abundant rivers and game, but because in Anderson's 
estimate the soil was also fertile, Thus the Indian 
could be brought to civilization gradually. Anderson's 
suggestion for the Manitoulin was not a rejection of the 
attempt to civilize the Ojibwa, indeed the justification 
for its creation was the success that the Coldwater-Narrows 
had demonstrated and the propensity of the Indian for 
change. Colborne's acceptance of Anderson's recommenda-
tions was also a demonstration of his support of the 
civilization process not a denial of it. But behind it 
lay the implicit perception that this change must come 
slowly. The Indian, they believed, had demonstrated at 
Coldwater-Narrows that they had to be gradually brought 
to farming while still able to support themselves, at 
least partially, from the hunt. Above all, the Indian 
must be isolated sufficiently from white settlers to allow 
them to retain possession of their land v1hile they were 
still not cultivating it adeq_uately enough to stop en-
croachment. 
There is no doubt that Anderson exaggerated the 
success of the Coldwater-Narrows establishment. There is 
also little doubt that this exaggeration was not only due 
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to a desire to have his dreams of the settlement at 
Manitoulin become a reality, but to insure his position 
as Superintendent there. Anderson realized the Superin-
tendent of such a large station would have significant 
power and handled properly would ensure his future with-
in the Department.* Even so it is still apparent that 
both Anderson and Colborne viewed the Manitoulin Island 
as a further step in the civilization process. 
Colborne agreed to Anderson's plan for Manitoulin 
Island. Anderson wished to give each family one hundred 
acres, but only to provide them with the tools and 
instruction necessary for them to build their own houses 
and establish their own farms. Anderson estimated the 
cost of the establishment for the first year would be 
approximately thirty-five hundred pounds,(9) but when 
ordered to make substantial cuts in this estimate he 
found he was able to do so with little difficulty.(lO) 
Conseq_uently in the spring of 1836 Anderson was ordered 
to repair to the island to begin preparations. 
*As indeed it did. Anderson was kept on despite the 
drastic reduction of the Department in 1836, becoming 
Chief Superintendent after Jarvis' death in 1845, 
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Despite Colborne's and Anderson's initiation it 
was the new Lieutenant Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head, who 
eventually shaped the tenor of the settlement on Manitoulin 
Island and its role in the history of the Ojibwa in Upper 
Canada. Head took over control of the Indian Department 
at a time when there was almost a constant clamouring for 
a reduction in the expenses of the Department. The 
Committee of the House of Commons on Military Expenditures 
in the Colonies in 1836 ruled that in their consideration 
"the Indian Department may be greatly reduced if not al-
together abolished.''(ll) ~hey consequently ordered Head to 
work towards that goal, and "in the meantime you will not 
consider yourself at liberty to fill up any vacancy which 
may occur in the establishment."(lZ) With these admon-
itions ringing in his ears, Head brought·an insurmountable 
will and his own unique vision of the North American Indian, 
some of it garnered from a cavalry dash across the 
Argentine Pampas, and some from the freshly emerging social 
Darwinism in Britain, to his position. 
After a brief period in the colony Head devised his 
often quoted analysis of the situation the Ojibwa and 
others in Upper Canada found themselves in. His report to 
Glenelg began, "Wherever and whenever the two races come 
in contact it is sure to prove fatal to the Red Man.,,(l 4 ) 
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Head believed that the Indian was not capable of grasping 
the arts of civilized life. Thus he believed that "the 
greatest kindness we can perform towards this intelligent, 
simple-minded people, is to remove and fortify them as 
much as possible from any communication with the whites."(l5) 
Head's solution was simple, direct and involved a 
perversion of.the Manitoulin scheme initiated by Colborne 
and Anderson. Head believed that it was against the nature 
of the Indian to cultivate the soil and that this nature 
was incapable of altering. Ojibwa possession of great 
tracts of fertile land in the midst of the growing colony 
was intolerable. Not only were Indians incapable of making 
use of the land, but their land was left open to the en-
croachments of white settlers who, because they could make 
good use of the soil, were justified in coveting Indian 
property. Manitoulin was the perfect answer to this 
dilemna, The island, isolated, rocky, was of no use to 
white settlers. Thus the Indian could live their obviously 
waning days there, secure from the abuses of the whites, 
while subsisting on the large.stocks of game and fish. 
This simple expedient would not only provide the Indian 
with peace, but would provide for the Government of Upper 
Canada "an immense portion of the most valuable land. "(16) 
All that remained was to convince the Indians of 
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the benefits of such a policy. Despite only halting 
support from the Colonial Office and the opposition of 
missionary groups, Head was, through promises, bribery and 
threats, able to force the abandonment of a number of 
reserves in Upper Canada. One of these was Coldwater-
Narrows. On the 6th of April 1837 Anderson closed the 
accounts at the Coldwater-Narrows establishment.(l7) 
The reaction to the news of the impending Indian 
Department withdrawal from the settlement was swift. 
Originally Aisance and other chiefs had petitioned to 
retain control themselves of the settlement, "wanting no 
person to be employed on our account but a miller and a 
sawyer" and these people for only one year while Indians 
were being trained. (l 3 ) They also wished title deeds to 
fifty acre lots, establishing themselves on the same 
footing as the settlers around them. Head agreed to Indian 
control of the mills, school house, etc., and to the 
employment of a miller and sawyer,(l9) but the transition 
was not swift enough. In the spring of 1837 Aisance and 
a number of chiefs took forcible possession of the grist 
and saw mills, confiscating the wheat inside and any that 
white settlers later brought into the mill.( 20) They also 
demanded a grant of a large sum of money and two years 
annuities in one lump sum. Following Anderson's exasperated 
suggestions that the Department give in to their demands 
and 
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"let them float on their own bottoms 
which will only be for a short time as they 
are already getting rid of all they can sell 
and ere long they will ground on poverty and 
disappointment," (21) 
this arrangement was agreed to by Head. 
Anderson's assessment proved, for a number of 
reasons, to be correct. Although a few Ojibwa families 
did settle on their lots and continued farming industrious-
ly for a number of years, the majority were not prepared 
to continue to expend the energy required to clear their 
lots and establish farms. With the area now being overrun 
by both traders and settlers neither Methodist ministers 
nor the Chiefs Aisance or Tawg_uinine had sufficient 
influence or authority to stop the bulk of the Ojibwa from 
selling many of their possessions and expending most of 
the annuities they received on the rum the traders offered 
so enticingly. By the summer of 1837 Peter Jones reported 
that both at the Narrows and Coldwater "the fields are grow-
ing over with weeds and bushes", The settlements appeared 
"g_ui te broken up", ( 22 ) and Anderson reported the traders 
were already putting their "clutches on the movables ... ( 23) 
Few of the Indians from the Coldwater--Nar:cows 
establishment followed Anderson to Manitoulin though. They 
had lived long in the Lake Simcoe area and were not pre-
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pared to move to a strange island on the prompting of a 
government which could give no firmer guarantee of the 
continued possession of their land than it had at Coldwater-
Narrows and against the advice of visiting Methodist 
Ministers. In 1838, after control of most of the land 
encompassed by the reserve was officially granted to the 
crown, Yellowhead's tribe moved to the Rama Reserve, 
purchased by Yellowhead at twelve shillings per acre,< 24 ) 
while others of the settlement returned to Beauseloil and 
back to Snake Island. In 1849 they ceded these islands 
and further retreated to Christian, Hope and Beckwith 
Islands. (25) John Sunday reported in 1839 tha+. many of 
them were "wandering about from one island to another"( 26 ) 
and the 1858 Report of the Special Commissioners to 
Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada, agreed that nei tlrnr 
Yellowhead's nor Aisance's tribes "had made little if any 
progress since 1838,"( 27) 
The abandonment of Coldwater-Narrows had resulted 
from a number of different forces acting in conjunction 
upon the Ojibwa and Indian Department in 1837, The 
proximity of other settlers, the encroachment that this 
entailed, combined with the internal conflicts to negate 
any sense of permanence in the establishment, a sense that 
was badly needed if the Ojibwa were to develop the trust 
rc-ig_uired to place their faith in their own exertions as 
farmers. But it was not this encroachment, nor Indian 
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reaction to it, which was the fundamental spark leading to 
Coldwater-Narrows abandonment. 
Both Anderson and Colborne had simply come to 
believe that their efforts and the resources of the Depart-
ment as a whole could more completely fulfill the desired 
ends (in the case of Anderson his personal ends also) if 
directed towards Manitoulin Island and the western Indians 
who were expected to settle there. Bond Head upon his 
arrival was able to pervert that scheme to enable him both 
to place the Ojibwa in a situation which more accurately 
reflected his perception of their character and potential 
and, more central to his considerations, to remove what 
had become too obviously a barrier to the continued devel-
opment of the interior of the colony. 
CHAPTER 14 
CONCLUSION 
Robert Surtees in his study of the development of 
the Indian reserve policy on the part of the government in 
Upper Canada asserts that "The Great Manitoulin was the 
rock which would make or destroy the project of civilizing 
the Indian."(l) He is indeed justified in attributing 
great import to Manitoulin, not only as concerns the 
establishment of reserves for the Ojibwa but, eventually, 
for all Indians in what was to become the Dominion of 
Canada. But Manitoulin'deserves this consideration not 
because it was to be the proving ground for the civilization 
project as he suggests, but because in the manner in which 
it was finally established it symbolized the abandonment 
of that policy. The Coldwater-Narrows agricultural enclave 
was the rock, or more accurately the marsh, on which the 
policy flourished briei'ly and was subsequently abandoned, 
The Manitoulin Reserve exists as a dramatic representation 
of its abandonment. 
The approximately two hundred years from the 
tentative beginnings of the development of increased cooper-
ation among the northern Algonkian bands around Sault Ste. 
Marie to the dispersal of the Ojibwa and Potaganasee which 
had gathered at Coldwater-Narrows had been a period of 
dramatic and abrupt change for the Ojibwa. In that time 
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the Ojibwa, emerging from the early proto-Ojibwa kin 
groups, developed a loose tribal entity which spread over 
almost a quarter of a continent. By effectively respond-
ing to the fur trade, particularly after the dispersal of 
the Huron, they enjoyed a prolonged period of cultural 
fluorescense and economic prosperity. 
This economic prosperity, the vast areas which had 
come under their control, and their aboriginal adherence 
to a hunting life helped insure that their capacity to wage 
war would keep pace with their cultural growth. They were 
able to demonstrate this capacity in the Southern Great 
Lakes area in the latter part of the seventeenth century 
by being a major component of the alliance which held their 
own against the rroquoiTJ.nd Ii.al ted their northern expansion. 
This strength ensured that their loyalty and allegiance 
would be solicited by the French, English and later Americans, 
in their continual vying for increased control of the Great 
Lakes area. Their allegiance was sought, not only for 
military advantage, but because as, perhaps, the most 
efficient exploiters of the fur trade in the Great Lakes 
area they were of significant economic importance to both 
French and English interests in North America. 
Although becoming increasingly drawn into the fur 
trade and dependent on the goods they were able to accumulate 
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from it, their ability to exploit both their location and 
competition for their furs and loyalty, not only allowed 
them to maintain their economic prosperity but fostered a 
sense of superiority in their tribal traditions and secur-
ity in the organisms developed to deal with the world 
around them. This security helped insure that the Ojibwa 
as a whole would resist Christian teaching in the form of 
Jesuit and Recollet priests, would remain confident enough 
in traditional authority and society to adopt voluntarily 
what changes were necessary in aboriginal structures to 
meet the demands altered circumstances required. 
The conquest of Canada and the effective removal 
of the French from any position of influence in North 
America marked the beginning of a growing deterioration 
in that economic prosperity. The beaver was no longer 
abundant. The prime area for the garnering o:f :furs had 
spread farther west, beyond land controlled by the Ojibwa. 
With the defeat of the French there was also a marked 
decrease in the amount of solicitation in the form of 
presents available to the Ojibwa, presents the Ojibwa had 
come to depend upon. 
More importantly, though, the disruption of the 
trade caused by the war and the decline in their bargaining 
power had demonstrated to the Ojibwa their position was 
:, 
I 
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becoming precarious. They no longer controlled the tools 
needed for their existence, nor did they have the power 
or influence required to insure their supply. The depen-
dence of their position was fast becoming obvious. Ojibwa 
confidence and security suffered, The process, though, 
was gradual. The still respectable percentage of the fur 
trade controlled by the Ojibwa and American Independence 
helped delay a time which, in retrospect at least, was 
inevitable. 
For the Ojibwa the culmination of this process 
occurred first in the Southern Great Lakes area and spread 
northward. Their economic prosperity declined still further 
as the growing dependence of their position and their 
awareness of it eroded their confidence in Ojibwa society, 
increasing the attractiveness of the now paramount trade 
item, alcohol. European epidemic diseases which until now 
had left the Ojibwa remarkably unscathed finally began to 
vent their full wrath on Ojibwa bands. Settlers, to whom 
the Ojibwa could never be more than a nuisance and a hazard, 
began at first to trickle and then to pour into Upper 
Canada. In a surprisingly short time they were able to 
determine the temper of that society. 
As Upper Canada evolved from being primarily 
organii,ed around the exploitation of the fur trade to 
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being increasingly geared towards the development of the 
pioneer farmer the Ojibwa position became even more pre-
carious. Their land was purchased from them (fairly or 
not, it was simply a formality). They increasingly 
depended upon the presents and rations handed out by the 
military and Indian Department, a handout prompted partly 
by a sense of obligation on the part of the government and 
partly because of an anachronistic perception of both 
the Indian and Indian Department's role. The Ojibwa in 
Upper Canada were simply running out of room. 
Significant elements within various Ojibwa bands 
were aware of the need for a fundamental change, a change 
the Ojibwa were simply not prepared to make without assis-
tance. The occasional petition for such assistance fell 
upon deaf ears within the Indian Department, imbued with 
its anachronistic perception and obscured with maintaining 
the allegiance of the still powerful western tribes. When 
agents, in the form of Methodists, capable of assisting in 
these. changes did finally present themselves the Ojibwa 
showed themselves·ready to accept that assistance. This 
welcome was only heightened by the offering of an alter-
native form of worship to replace one which, to some Ojibwa 
at least, had demonstrated noted ineffectiveness, a form 
of worship whose style appealed to the Ojibwa's dramatic 
belief in the power of the spiritual. 
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The welcome was assured by the work of Peter Jones 
and others, men who could fit into the Ojibwa world but who 
had demonstrated they could adjust to the society around 
them. The welcome was assisted in its spread by the co-
option of traditional chiefs. These chiefs, prompted by 
the Methodists, realized their traditional authority, 
becoming less and less effective, could be enhanced by 
their new position as native exhorters for the Methodist 
Church. Authority within Ojibwa society had always been 
granted to those who demonstrated effectiveness and it was 
the Methodists and the Ojibwa most active in spreading 
their teaching who were rncst effective in dealing with the 
changing circumstances around them. 
The Indian Department in the colony was also 
experiencing changes. Still impressed with the need for 
maintaining the allegiance of the Ojibwa, particularly the 
western Ojibwa, and apprehensive about American influence 
among them, they were increasingly beseeched by the demands 
of the Treasury to reduce the high cost of maintaining that 
allegiance. Prompted by Methodist examples, spurred by a 
fear of the American impulses o.f the Methodist Church, 
amidst increasing petitions and even veiled threats from 
Ojibwa chiefs and imbued with its own growing sense of 
duty to the Indian bands, the Indian Department haltingly 
developed a new perception of the Indian. Control over 
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the Indian Department was transferred from military to 
civil authority. 
This transfer was significant. The Indian Depart-
ment was now intent on establishing Indian farming 
communities based on the Methodist example, This new 
direction did not, however, remove the continuing desire 
to adhere permanantly the allegiance of the western tribes 
while reducing the costs of the Department. ,Under the 
promptings of an efficient and ambitious superintendent, 
Lieutenant Governor Colborne decided to establish the 
government's first farming enclave on the northern limits 
of settlement in the colony running from Coldwater to 
the Narrows of Lake Simcoe. 
The first spoke in the government's civilization 
policy was in a strategic location. -Not only would its 
location allow the government to establish a large agric-
ultural enclave encompassing Ojibwa from both Lake Simcoe 
a.nd Lake Huron but would also allow for govern'llent control 
of a road from Lake Simcoe to Lake Huron which would assist 
with the settlement and defense of the colony. Most 
importantly, its location would allow western Ojibway 
visiting Penetanguishene for their annual presents to 
observe their brothers' progress and entice them to join 
the settlement. 
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From its outset the enclave met with significant 
opposition and was rocked with problems. Methodist success 
at such establishments as the Credit Mission had resulted 
from a sense of direction imbued by the cooperation of the 
Methodists and Ojibwa. This cooperation had only been 
attained by ensuring that traditional authority within the 
band was not threatened by Methodist exertion and perceived 
that the goals of the establishment could only enhance 
their own position. Native Methodist exhorters such as 
Peter Jones, Peter Jacobs and John Sunday either were or 
became Ojibwa chiefs. Using the same formula Chiefs 
Yellowhead and Snake of the Lake Simcoe Ojibwa were co-
opted to deliver messages concerning the benefits of 
Methodist teaching and orderly life to more northern 
Ojibwa. The Indian Department was unable and unwilling 
to follow the same pattern in establishing the Coldwater-
Narrows settlement. 
The role of Superintendent as perceived within 
the Indian Department too obviously infringed upon the 
prerogatives of the traditional chiefs for these chiefs 
to see how they could enhance their own authority within 
the limits of the establishment. If the responsibilities 
of Superintendent had not required this conflict it is 
probable that Anderson's character and ambition would have 
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ensured that it occurred at Coldwater-Narrows. 
The possibility of effective cooperation was 
further limited by an increasingly bitter fight between 
the Department and Methodist ministers. A brief period 
of cooperation between the Methodists and government 
quickly disintegrated amidst heightening government 
suspicion of Methodist influence and increasingly des-
perate attempts by the Methodists to maintain that 
influence. At Coldwater conflict was further aggravated 
by a Catholic faction. As powerful elements of tradi-
tional Ojibwa society had already aligned themselves with 
both the Methodist and Catholic faiths and saw this 
association as a means for extending their own authority, 
it was inevitable that they would increasingly oppose 
Superintendent Anderson as his actions more blatantly 
threatened both associations. It is not surprising that 
the establishment at Coldwater-Narrows increasingly failed 
to show the type of cohesion needed to live up to demanding 
Indian Department expectations and to supply the Ojibwa 
with the direction needed to withstand external pressure. 
As the population of Upper Canada spread northward, 
surrounding the Coldwater-Narrows Reserve, the Ojibwa 
became increasingly apprehensive. Given the already un-
settled state of the enclave, the harassment from white 
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settlers and traders, the few instances of encroachment 
and the advances of closely encamped immigrants simply 
increased the disruption within the settlement and helped 
insure the Ojibwa would find it increasingly difficult 
to have confidence in Coldwater-Narrows or their future 
within it. 
Both Anderson and Lieutenant Governor Colborne 
soon realized that on its present footing the enclave 
would not be effective in prompting the northern bands 
to join the establishment or adopt the orderly industrious 
life, At the same time Anderson, exasperated with the 
problems at Coldwater-Narrows, still intent on the 
original concept of establishing a station among the 
northern Indians, believed that on Manitoulin, where a 
Church of England minister was already establishing a 
mission, he could begin a settlement which could avoid the 
problems of Methodist and Catholic intrigues and white 
encroachment. Justifying his optimistic plans for Mani-
toulin on an exaggerated assessment of the success of 
Coldwater-Narrows, he proposed an even more extensive 
settlement on the island. His suggestions were accepted 
by Colborne and plans made. 
But before the Manitoulin establishment could be 
commenced Colborne was replaced by Sir Francis Bond Head. 
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Head used the Manitoulin establishment to help convince a 
number of Ojibwa bands to abandon land they controlled in 
Upper Canada, land which had become valuable for the 
continued settlement of the colony. For Anderson the 
settlement on Manitoulin Island was to be a modified 
agricultural settlement, one in which the Indians would 
be able to fish and hunt for a significant period of time 
while adjusting to a farming life, Head carried the pro-
gression from the concept of an agricultural enclave one 
step further, believing that the Ojibwa were incapable of 
the adaptation. Head established Manitoulin Island as a 
haven, a place for the Indian to waste away their few 
remaining years secure from the vices of the white populace 
around them, 
Thus the Coldwater-Narrows settlement remains the 
primary instance of the government's att8nipt to establish 
an agricultural reserve in Upper Canada. Other smaller 
settlements were begun, but in none of these were the 
resources of the department concentrated as they were in 
Coldwater-Narrows. The abandonment of that settlement by 
the Indian Department in 1837 marked that department's 
belie~ distorted by Sir Francis Bond Head to be sure, 
but implicitly afi'irmed bei'ore his arrival, that the 
Ojibwa in Upper Canada were not yet ready to make that 
adaptation. 
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In contrast, the abandonment o:f the Coldwater-
Narrows Reserve by the Ojibwa was not primarily a result 
o:f their inability to e:f:fect that transition, It was the 
end result o:f the :failure on the part o:f these elements, 
the Methodists, the Indian Department, who were inter-
ested in the development o:f agricultural missions or 
reserves to cooperate su:f:ficiently to supply needed 
direction to the settlement. Traditional authority in 
the Ojibwa bands had been able to identify its own position 
with the interests o:f Methodists, While the Indian Depart--
ment, particularly Anderson, increasingly opposed the 
Methodists these chief's alternately saw the maintenance o:f 
their position as dependent upon at one point opposing the 
Methodists and at another opposing government measures 
against the Methodists. Thus no element o:f authority, 
either Indian Department, Methodist, Catholic or tradition-
al chief's, was able to supply consistent direction towards 
the ultimate end. When both the government and Methodists 
eventually demonstrated that they were no longer prepared 
to expend su:f:ficient energy to maintain the settlement, 
Ojibwa society lacked the commitment,and as yet, the tools 
necessary to assume the directive role. 
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